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“EQUALITY AND PRIVACY BY DESIGN”:         
A NEW MODEL OF ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE DATA TRANSPARENCY VIA 
AUDITING, CERTIFICATION, AND SAFE 
HARBOR REGIMES 
 
Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid & Sean K. Hallisey* 
ABSTRACT 
Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning (AI) are often 
described as technological breakthroughs that will completely 
transform our society and economy.  AI systems have been 
implemented everywhere, from medicine, transportation, finance, art, 
to legal and social spheres, and even in weapons development.  In 
many sectors, AI systems have already started making decisions 
previously made by humans.  Promising as AI systems may be, they 
also pose urgent challenges to our everyday life.  While much 
attention has concerned AI’s legal implications, the literature suffers 
from a lack of solutions that account for both legal and engineering 
practices and constraints.  This leaves technology firms without 
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guidelines and increases the risk of societal harm.  It also means that 
policymakers and judges operate without a regulatory regime to turn 
to when addressing these novel and unpredictable outcomes.  This 
Article tries to fill the void by focusing on data rather than on the 
software and programmers.  It suggests a new model that stems from 
a recognition of the significant role that the data plays in the 
development and functioning of AI systems. 
Data is the most important aspect of teaching AI systems to 
operate.  AI algorithms begin with a massive preexisting dataset, 
which data providers use to train the system.  But the data that AI 
systems “swallow” can be illegal, discriminatory, altered, unreliable, 
or simply incomplete.  Thus, the more data fed to the AI systems, the 
higher the likelihood that they could produce biased, discriminatory 
decisions and violate privacy rights.  The Article discusses how 
discrimination can arise, even inadvertently, from the operation of 
“trusted” and “objective” AI systems. 
To address this problem, this Article proposes a new AI Data 
Transparency Model that focuses on disclosure of data rather than, as 
some scholars argue, focusing on the initial software program and 
programmers.  The Model includes an auditing regime and a 
certification program, run either by a governmental body or, in the 
absence of such entity, by private institutions.  This Model will 
encourage the industry to take proactive steps to ensure and publicize 
that datasets are trustworthy.  The suggested Model includes a safe 
harbor, which incentivizes firms to implement transparency 
recommendations even without massive regulatory oversight.  From 
an engineering point of view, the Model recognizes data providers 
and big data as the most important components in the process of 
creating, training and operating AI systems.  Even more importantly, 
the Model is technologically feasible because data can be easily 
absorbed and kept by a technological tool.  Further, this Model is also 
practically feasible because it follows already existing legal 
frameworks of data transparency, such as the ones being 
implemented by the FDA and the SEC. 
Improving transparency in data systems would result in less 
harmful AI systems, better protect societal rights and norms, and 
produce improved outcomes in this emerging field, especially for 
minority communities that often lack resources or representation to 
challenge AI systems.  Increased transparency of the data used while 
developing, training or operating AI systems would mitigate and 
reduce these harms.  Additionally, to better identify the risks of faulty 
data, industry players must conduct critical evaluations and audits of 
the data used to train AI systems; one way to incentivize this is a 
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certification system to publicize good-faith efforts to reduce the 
possibility of discriminatory outcomes and privacy violations in AI 
systems.  This Article strives to incentivize the creation of new 
standards, which the industry could implement from the genesis of AI 
systems to mitigate the possibility of harm, rather than post-hoc 
assignments of liability. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Commentators and experts frequently herald artificial intelligence 
(“AI”) as a technological breakthrough that will completely 
transform our society and economy.1  From medicine to 
transportation, finance to art, legal systems to social structures, and 
many other sectors, AI systems hire, fire, grant loans, predict diseases, 
and decide who will go to jail and how long they will stay there.2  
Many decisions previously determined by humans are now made by 
autonomous AI systems.3  These AI systems, embedded in computers 
 
 1. See MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: THE NEXT DIGITAL 
FRONTIER? 4 (2017), 
https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Industries/Advanced%20Electronics/
Our%20Insights/How%20artificial%20intelligence%20can%20deliver%20real%20valu
e%20to%20companies/MGI-Artificial-Intelligence-Discussion-paper.ashx 
[https://perma.cc/JF98-XLCJ] (“Artificial intelligence is poised to unleash the next 
wave of digital disruption, and companies should prepare for it now.  We already see 
real-life benefits for a few early-adopting firms, making it more urgent than ever for 
others to accelerate their digital transformations.  . . . AI investment is growing fast, 
dominated by digital giants such as Google and Baidu.  Globally, we estimate tech 
giants spent $20 billion to $30 billion on AI in 2016, with 90 percent of this spent on 
R&D and deployment.  . . . [E]arly AI adopters that combine strong digital capability 
with proactive strategies have higher profit margins and expect the performance gap 
with other firms to widen in the future . . . . [E]arly adopters are already creating 
competitive advantages, and the gap with the laggards looks set to grow.  A successful 
program requires firms to address many elements of a digital and analytics 
transformation, including set up the right data ecosystem.”). 
 2. See, e.g., Hilke Schellmann & Jason Bellini, Artificial Intelligence: The 
Robots Are Hiring, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 20, 2018), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/artificial-intelligence-the-robots-are-now-hiring-moving-
upstream-1537435820 [https://perma.cc/X26T-556Z]; Ingrid Lunden, Kabbage Gets 
$200M from Credit Suisse to Expand Its AI-Based Business Loans, TECH CRUNCH 
(Nov. 11, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/11/16/kabbage-gets-200m-from-credit-
suisse-to-expand-its-ai-based-business-loans/[https://perma.cc/HV64-EWN6]; Adam 
Liptak, Sent to Prison by a Software Program’s Secret Algorithms, N.Y. TIMES (May 
1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/01/us/politics/sent-to-prison-by-a-
software-programs-secret-algorithms.html [https://perma.cc/MD23-6P4R]; Steve 
Lohr, IBM Creates Watson Health to Analyze Medical Data, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 
2015), https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/04/13/ibm-creates-watson-health-to-
analyze-medical-data/ [https://perma.cc/J7JV-DPCH] (describing the practical 
applications of AI to various industries). 
 3. See Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 
633 (2017) (“The accountability mechanisms and legal standards that govern such 
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and robots, have begun to automate workplaces and have created 
new applications that rely on the vast amounts of data produced by 
society’s daily occurrences.4  Corporations, governments, and 
individuals are investing in the AI sector, creating the specter of a 
new Industrial Revolution.  But if society comes to over-rely on AI 
too rapidly, it risks overlooking potential problems that may arise.5  It 
is true that machine learning offers broad opportunities for 
 
decision processes have not kept pace with technology.  The tools currently available 
to policymakers, legislators, and courts were developed to oversee human 
decisionmakers and often fail when applied to computers instead.  For example, how 
do you judge the intent of a piece of software? Because automated decision systems 
can return potentially incorrect, unjustified, or unfair results, additional approaches 
are needed to make such systems accountable and governable.”); Joy Buolamwini & 
Timnit Gebru, Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy Disparities in Commercial 
Gender Classification, 81 PROC. MACHINE LEARNING RES. 1, 1 (2018) (“Even AI-
based technologies that are not specifically trained to perform high-stakes tasks (such 
as determining how long someone spends in prison) can be used in a pipeline that 
performs such tasks.”); HANNAH FRY, HELLO WORLD: BEING HUMAN IN THE AGE OF 
ALGORITHM 25–48, 49–78, 141–74 (2018) (discussing the biases and risks of AI 
systems in different fields, such as justice, data analytics and crime, in contrast to the 
trust and faith the public give to advanced technology); see also MCKINSEY GLOBAL 
INST., supra note 1, at 31–69 (describing the use of AI systems and its implications in 
different fields, including retail, electric utility, manufacturing, healthcare and 
education); Danielle Keats Citron & Frank A. Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due 
Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2014) (discussing the 
vast use of AI systems versus its risks); Hilke Schellmann & Jason Bellini, Artificial 
Intelligence: The Robots Are Now Hiring — Moving Upstream, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 
20, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/video/series/moving-upstream/artificial-intelligence-
the-robots-are-now-hiring-moving-upstream/2790C6B9-4E47-4544-9331-
36DB418366CF?mod=searchresults&page=1&pos=3 [https://perma.cc/V4XV-RX9A] 
(noting that “nearly all Fortune 500 companies” are using tools that deploy AI to 
weed out job applicants, including a video that discusses biases and fairness); 
DELOITTE, THE STATE OF THE DEAL: M&A TRENDS 2019 (2018) 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/mergers-
acqisitions/us-mergers-acquisitions-trends-2019-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/D2L2-
C2YK] (detailing 1,000 executives’ expectations and involvement with M&A activity 
and emerging technologies); Leon Saunders Calvert, Using AI to Predict 
Opportunity in M&A, REFINITIV: DEAL INSIGHTS (June 20, 2018), 
https://blogs.thomsonreuters.com/financial-risk/ai-digitalization/using-ai-to-predict-
opportunity-in-m-and-a/ [https://perma.cc/TXU4-4SA8]. 
 4. See Jason Bellini, The Robot Revolution: The New Age of Manufacturing, 
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 1, 2008), https://www.wsj.com/video/series/moving-upstream/the-
robot-revolution-the-new-age-of-manufacturing-moving-upstream/0C3B7686-7D97-
4BCE-980B-FAED24F27672 [https://perma.cc/TY36-6RGT] (reporting that 
hundreds of millions of jobs are affected by AI, and trillions of dollars of wealth are 
created by replacing employees). 
 5. See Kai-Fu Lee, The Human Promise of the AI Revolution, WALL ST. J. 
(Sept. 14, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-human-promise-of-the-ai-
revolution-1536935115 [https://perma.cc/UEC2-E4QV] (“The AI revolution will be 
of the magnitude of the Industrial Revolution — but probably larger and definitely 
faster.”). 
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innovation in a host of areas such as climate and physical, 
transactional, and behavioral data about people, pandemics, 
pharmaceuticals, infrastructure, and supply chains.6  However, as AI 
technologies grow in prominence and become more easily 
implementable, stakeholders must acknowledge that AI has the 
dangerous potential to violate laws and societal norms.7 
The growing AI industry is dominated by huge firms that collect, 
hold, or can afford to access massive amounts of data.8  But data can 
be flawed — indeed, instances abound of massive companies utilizing 
AI systems that produce biased outcomes.  In one instance, Amazon’s 
AI facial recognition software, Rekognition, wrongly identified 
twenty-eight members of Congress as individuals who had jail 
mugshots.9  These results demonstrate the existence of race and 
gender biases present in facial recognition AI system.10  Similarly, 
Facebook’s software is known to identify the “ethnic affinities” of 
users’ characteristics, which advertisers can then use to exclude 
 
 6. See Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is for, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1921–22 
(2013). 
 7. See MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., supra note 1, at 4, 8 (stating that “AI promises 
benefits, but also poses urgent challenges that cut across firms, developers, 
government, and workers,” and that “machine learning has limitations.  For example, 
because the systems are trained on specific data sets, they can be susceptible to bias; 
to avoid this, users must be sure to train them with comprehensive data set.”); Liam 
Hanel, A List of Artificial Intelligence Tools You Can Use Today  — For Businesses, 
MEDIUM (July 11, 2017), https://medium.com/@LiamHanel/a-list-of-artificial-
intelligence-tools-you-can-use-today-for-businesses-2-3-eea3ac374835 
[https://perma.cc/KB54-S3YE]; see also Daniel Newman, AI and ML Prediction to 
2019, FORBES (July 23, 2018, 10:56 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielnewman/2018/07/23/three-ai-and-machine-
learning-predictions-for-2019/#238d7c784948 [https://perma.cc/7HHX-K96F]. 
 8. See MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., supra note 1, at 14; see also Rana el Kaliouby, 
This App Knows How You Feel from the Look on Your Face, TED (May 2015), 
https://www.ted.com/talks/rana_el_kaliouby_this_app_knows_how_you_feel_from_th
e_look_on_your_face/transcript?language=en [https://perma.cc/MDM5-8DAU] 
(describing how data was collected from 2.9 million face videos for a project that 
began at MIT). 
 9. Jacob Snow, Amazon’s Face Recognition Falsely Matched 28 Members of 
Congress with Mugshots, ACLU (July 26, 2018, 8:00 AM), 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/surveillance-technologies/amazons-
face-recognition-falsely-matched-28 [https://perma.cc/XZ4K-EZXG] (“Nearly 40 
percent of Rekognition’s false matches in our test were of people of color, even 
though they make up only 20 percent of Congress.”). 
 10. Buolamwini & Gebru, supra note 3, at 1 (demonstrating empirically that AI 
systems can discriminate based on classes like race and gender, and evaluating the 
biases present in automated facial analysis algorithms and datasets by percentage 
with respect to phenotypic subgroups). 
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certain users from viewing particular promotions.11  These troubling, 
biased consequences are not inevitable in an era of Autonomous, 
Automated, and Advanced AI Systems — the so-called “3A Era.”  
Rather, they highlight that AI technologies pose crucial challenges 
that policymakers must address.12  These challenges cut across firms, 
developers, governments, and employees; therefore, proper legal and 
regulatory schemes must be established to ensure that AI 
development is neither held back nor goes too far.13 
The innovations in AI technology are moving too fast for Congress 
to effectively understand and grapple with.  Inadequate regulatory 
schemes might be unbalanced: too permissive a scheme would give 
cover to and perpetuate existing discrimination in AI programs, while 
a scheme too restrictive would halt the development of AI technology 
altogether, stymying its potential benefits.  Thus, it is vital to create a 
framework that can help the industry, the public and policymakers 
identify where problems with data occur, how they occur, and why 
they occur.  Once these nuances are better understood, the 
government can more effectively regulate the AI industry.  To that 
end, this Article proposes an AI Data Transparency Model that 
focuses on illuminating how AI systems utilize data.  This Model 
differs from other commentaries on the risks of AI systems in that it 
does not oppose the use or expansion of AI systems.  Rather, this 
Model recognizes that regulatory schemes have to focus on the source 
of threats and hazards in AI systems — the data itself. 
The Transparency Model recommends an auditing and certification 
regime that will encourage transparency, and help developers and 
individuals learn about the potential threats of AI, discrimination, 
and the continued weakening of societal expectations of privacy.  If 
firms choose to utilize non-infringing data from beginning to end, 
 
 11. Julia Angwin & Terry Parris Jr., Facebook Lets Advertisers Exclude Users by 
Race, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 28, 2016, 1:00 PM), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-lets-advertisers-exclude-users-by-race 
[https://perma.cc/5GGJ-4SNK] (“The ubiquitous social network not only allows 
advertisers to target users by their interests or background, it also gives advertisers 
the ability to exclude specific groups it calls ‘Ethnic Affinities.’  Ads that exclude 
people based on race, gender and other sensitive factors are prohibited by federal law 
in housing and employment.”). 
 12. See generally Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid & Xiaoqiong (Jackie) Liu, When 
Artificial Intelligence Systems Produce Inventions: The 3A Era and an Alternative 
Model for Patent Law, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 2215 (2018) (discussing why intellectual 
property laws have become irrelevant, outdated and inapplicable in the 3A Era, 
when AI systems produce patentable inventions or copyrightable works of art, and 
suggesting an alternative model for patent law). 
 13. MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., supra note 1, at 4. 
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from the very first steps of developing and training AI systems 
through the actual operation of those systems, the likelihood of 
discriminatory outcomes and privacy violations will be greatly 
reduced. 
The proposed Transparency Model takes into account the nature 
of how AI systems work and the prevalence of multiple stakeholders, 
each of whom is responsible for developing and operating AI systems 
(the “Multi-Player Model”).14  These stakeholders may include 
software programmers, data providers, users, sellers and distributors 
of AI systems, manufacturers, and others such as the public and the 
shareholders of firms.15  As part of the regulatory scheme of the 
Model, we first contend that each of these stakeholders, especially the 
data providers, should concern themselves with potential adverse 
outcomes that AI systems might create.  Stakeholders must consider 
the possibility that AI systems will misinterpret data and produce 
discriminatory outcomes or otherwise violate human rights.  The 
Model includes a certification process, whereby stakeholders can 
align, assert, and publicize their efforts to produce AI systems that 
conform with a transparency industry standard.  This certification can 
be determined internally, or conducted by a third-party auditing 
agency; either way, the purpose is to encourage the development of a 
certifiable, uniform industry standard.  This Article argues that 
cultivation of a strong certification process is soundly justified by law 
and economics and would spur public demand for ethical use of AI.  
Finally, the Model will raise awareness about the dangers that may 
arise when stakeholders overlook the possibility that certain 
compositions of data can have discriminatory effects. 
Just as technology has exploded in the 3A Era, so has the literature 
concerning the legal implications of AI’s proliferation.16  However, 
the literature to date has tended to focus on the operation of AI 
 
 14. Yanisky-Ravid & Liu, supra note 12, at 2231–36 (coining the “Multi-Player 
Model” and describing the affiliation between each of the entities in AI systems and 
the challenge to ownership and accountability that a model of many stakeholders 
imposes on the AI industry).  The development of AI systems is a multi-faceted 
process, involving numerous “stakeholders.”  Such stakeholders include data 
collectors, data aggregators, programmers, trainers, operators, all the way up to 
executives who market and sell AI services.  We use the term “stakeholders” to 
encapsulate each of these roles, because we argue that each of these distinct actors 
should concern themselves with the ramifications of AI systems and grapple with 
their effects. 
 15. See id. 
 16. See Ryan Calo, Artificial Intelligence Policy: A Primer and a Roadmap, 51 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV 399, 401, 403 (2017). 
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systems, rather than on the data used to train them.17  This leaves 
technology firms without guidelines, which increases the risk of 
societal harm and leaves policymakers and judges without a 
regulatory regime to turn to when addressing the novel and 
unpredictable outcomes of AI systems.  This Article also tries to fill 
that void with the Transparency Model, which focuses on data, rather 
than on software programmers or algorithms.  It is important to 
mention that some scholars, notably Professor Joel Reidenberg, have 
opposed the prevailing position that transparency of software and 
algorithms alone will not completely resolve existing issues of bias 
and prejudice in AI.18  This work goes a step further to suggest great 
emphasis and focus must be placed on the data itself.  Focusing on the 
data is vital and can usher in newfound understanding of how and to 
what extent AI systems should be integrated into nearly any aspect of 
society. 
A short review of some other important works that have been 
conducted regarding AI systems demonstrates that a thorough 
discussion of data itself is missing from the literature at large.  In a 
landmark article, Solon Barocas and Andrew D. Selbst, two scholars 
who have pioneered the study of the effects of big data and the 
advent of the internet on individuals’ privacy and civil rights, noted 
that algorithms and the use of big data compromise the spirit of 
decades old anti-discrimination statutes.19  They warned of the need 
to pass new statutes that counteract the dangers that algorithms and 
big data pose to society.20  There has been a steady creep of AI into 
consumer finance, and it remains an unresolved question who should 
bear the burden of ensuring that their AI applications do not 
discriminate, target, or fail to provide services to protected 
demographics.21  Current laws are insufficient to address these risks, 
but overregulation could hinder the development of the technology.22  
Many others have raised concerns about the new challenges that AI 
 
 17. See id. at 402 (collecting examples of scholars raising issues pertaining to the 
effects of AI systems and the “vast increase in computational power and access to 
training data . . . ”). 
 18. See Kroll et al., supra note 3, at 658 (“However, transparency [of source code] 
alone is not sufficient to provide accountability in all cases.”). 
 19. See generally Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate 
Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671 (2016). 
 20. Id. at 671 (“[A]n algorithm is only as good as the data it works with.”). 
 21. See, e.g., Mikella Hurley & Julius Adebayo, Credit Scoring in the Era of Big 
Data, 18 YALE J.L. & TECH. 148 (2016) (arguing that lenders should bear that 
burden). 
 22. See id. at 189–90. 
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systems pose for criminal justice.  For example, scholars have 
discussed the inadequacy of current legal doctrines in protecting 
citizens from automated suspicion algorithms, which identify suspects 
and suspicious activity that would ordinarily be identified by a human 
police officer.23 
There are numerous problematic features of machine learning 
algorithms that make regulation difficult.24  First, there is 
discreetness, the fact that machine learning applications can be 
developed with limited visible infrastructure.25  Next, because so 
many different entities develop machine learning applications, 
diffuseness makes it difficult to identify who should be regulated.26  
Further, the opacity of the developing process creates the possibility 
that the machine learning application will produce outcomes that are 
not traceable to particular inputs, and it might be difficult, if not 
impossible, to retroactively determine the rationale of the decision.27 
Policymakers cannot hope to resolve all the issues identified above 
by increasing transparency alone, but resolution certainly requires 
transparency.  Consider discreetness, for example: with better 
transparency, it would be possible to account for the infrastructure 
that is present.  Creating a log or record to detail who worked on a 
particular application and what their work entailed is certainly 
possible.28  Additionally, making the data sources of an AI 
application transparent would help control outcomes by ensuring that 
the application is using the “right” data, rather than impermissible 
ones.  Increasing transparency, thus, will contribute to a larger 
consensus: something needs to be done to address the new challenges 
created by AI and machine learning systems. 
This Article discusses how workflows and bottlenecks in AI 
development illuminate policy responses that could reveal the data 
sources used to train AI systems.  It further identifies data issues that 
 
 23. See MILES BRUNDAGE ET AL., THE MALICIOUS USE OF ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE: FORECASTING, PREVENTION, AND MITIGATION 28, 96 (2018); see also 
GABRIEL HALLEVY, WHEN ROBOTS KILL: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE UNDER 
CRIMINAL LAW  16, 21 (2013) (“Some researchers argue that the current law is 
inadequate for dealing with AI technology and that it is necessary to develop a new 
legal domain called Robot Law.”). 
 24. See Matthew U. Scherer, Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems: Risks, 
Challenges, Competencies, and Strategies, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 353, 369 (2016). 
 25. Id. at 369–70. 
 26. Id. at 370. 
 27. Id. at 371, 373. 
 28. See Deven R. Desai & Joshua A. Kroll, Trust but Verify: A Guide to 
Algorithms and the Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 8 (2017). 
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policymakers should focus on and proposes a Model of Data 
Transparency that could solve some of these issues.  Finally, this 
Article puts forth three modest recommendations.  First, stakeholders 
in the development of AI systems should take steps to audit the data 
used to train AI systems in order to ensure that the data does not 
violate regulatory requirements surrounding discrimination and 
privacy, or the rights of copyright holders.  Second, a certification 
process will help consumers and policymakers understand what is at 
stake and will clearly indicate to the public what operators ought to 
ensure that data is used properly.  Finally, a safe harbor approach that 
would limit liability for AI operators in certain circumstances, such as 
where an AI operator takes significant effort to avoid data misuse but 
a transgression occurs nonetheless. 
This Article proceeds in three parts.  Part I briefly describes how 
AI systems operate and how they develop, focusing on the important 
role that data plays in these processes.  Next, Part II examines issues 
surrounding datasets that can discriminate or violate privacy norms.  
Part III then presents the AI Data Transparency Model and discusses 
how it will help ameliorate the issues examined in Part II.  The main 
objective of this Article is to highlight that AI systems are not free of 
faults and vices, and to stress the vital role of data transparency in 
addressing these problems.  Through this framework, policymakers 
can better understand the interests at stake with respect to AI systems 
and the role they play in society, the economy, and the world. 
I. DATA MATTERS: TRAINING THE AI 
AI systems are different from traditional algorithms in that they 
incorporate human-like thought processes that enable them to make 
decisions autonomously.29  Throughout the development of AI 
systems, many different stakeholders offer critical contributions.  One 
of the most important phases of creating AI systems is “teaching” 
them to operate, which starts with a preexisting dataset that data 
providers use to train the systems.30  These providers can be 
programmers, trainers, the ones who enable access to data, or the 
 
 29. See Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, Generating Rembrandt, 2017 MICH. ST. L. REV. 
659, 661–63 (2017); see also Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 21, at 159 (defining an 
algorithm as “any well-defined computational procedure that takes some value, or set 
of values, as input and produces some value, or set of values, as an output”) (quoting 
THOMAS H. CORMEN ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO ALGORITHMS 1 (3d ed. 2009)). 
 30. See, e.g., Training ML Models, AMAZON MACHINE LEARNING, 
https://docs.aws.amazon.com/machine-learning/latest/dg/training-ml-models.html 
[https://perma.cc/YN3A-F9TX]. 
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systems’ users — whatever entity assembles the data is, in a sense, the 
data provider.  By studying the data, the AI system learns to 
recognize patterns and similarities; as the system absorbs more 
datapoints, its capabilities grow in an evolving and never-ending 
process.31  Whereas an algorithm or formula creates outputs that 
derive from fixed weights attached to input variables, an AI system 
adjusts its weights according to the patterns it identifies from ideal 
outcomes chosen by the data provider.32  Even with this control over 
the data provided, AI systems often remain black boxes: They may be 
able to correctly and consistently predict a particular outcome, such 
as the likelihood of credit default, but they cannot explain the reasons 
for this conclusion.33 
AI systems have become ubiquitous and easy to develop.  The 
proliferation of AI systems has resulted in numerous ready-to-use 
options available for free download on the internet.34  Once the AI 
structure is installed, the data trainer exposes it to vast amounts of 
data, teaching it what outcomes are desirable and to reject unwanted 
ones. Through this process, the AI learns to recognize patterns that 
could lead it to identify positive matches on its own.35  The current 
explosion of AI applications would not have been possible without 
the advent of “Big Data” and the ability of entities to collect massive 
amounts of information.  Huge repositories of data exist on the 
internet,36 but trainers can also create their own datasets or rely on 
third parties to collect new data.37  However, a critical limitation of 
 
 31. Maayan Perel & Niva Elkin-Koren, Black Box Tinkering: Beyond Disclosure 
in Algorithmic Enforcement, 69 FLA. L. REV. 181, 189–90 (2017); see also Yanisky-
Ravid, supra note 29, at 672–81(describing the process of developing AI systems and 
their ten human-like features, such as creativity, autonomy and unpredictability). 
 32. See Lee Bell, Machine Learning Versus AI: What’s the Difference?, WIRED 
(Dec. 1, 2016), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/machine-learning-ai-explained 
[https://perma.cc/8Y3K-5KTG]. 
 33. Will Knight, The Dark Secret at the Heart of AI, MIT TECH. REV. (Apr. 11, 
2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/604087/the-dark-secret-at-the-heart-of-ai/ 
[https://perma.cc/S52Q-CWHA]. 
 34. See, e.g., TENSORFLOW, https://www.tensorflow.org/ [https://perma.cc/MPN7-
SNLM]. 
 35. Hence, the advent of the “Big Data” era.  Merriam-Webster defines “big 
data” as “an accumulation of data that is too large and complex for processing by 
traditional database management tools.” Big Data, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (Online ed. 
2019), https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/big%20data 
[https://perma.cc/4FTG-R6PK]. 
 36. See, e.g., Datasets, KAGGLE, https://www.kaggle.com/datasets 
[https://perma.cc/46EX-ZXMN]. 
 37. The bAbI Project, FACEBOOK RESEARCH, 
https://research.fb.com/downloads/babi [https://perma.cc/2PS7-ZWBY]. 
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reusing existing data is the difficulty of determining its origins, 
because data collected and tailored for one use may not be 
appropriate for another use.38 
The utility of a dataset depends in large part on four attributes: its 
volume, velocity, variety, and veracity.39  Volume indicates its size; 
velocity indicates its “freshness,” that is, whether or not the 
datapoints have become outdated; variety refers to the sources of 
data (for example, some datasets combine information from various 
sources, often making them more valuable); and veracity refers to the 
data’s accuracy.40  As the AI is exposed to data, its system identifies 
patterns and can be taught to perform a huge variety of tasks, 
including differentiating dogs from cats,41 bad omens from good 
omens,42 or criminals who are likely to reoffend from those who are 
not.43  An AI system can learn to recognize faces or emotions by 
sifting through huge sets of portraits from people all around the world 
conveying different emotions — it can distinguish between anger and 
sadness, or between one face and another for any number of 
purposes.44  As long as there is sufficient data to train an AI system, 
the potential applications are endless.  This process is called machine 
learning.45 
 
 38. Michael Mattioli, Disclosing Big Data, 99 MINN. L. REV. 535, 544–46 (2014). 
 39. Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Michal S. Gal, Access Barriers to Big Data, 59 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 339, 345–46 (2017). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Dogs vs. Cats, KAGGLE, https://www.kaggle.com/c/dogs-vs-cats 
[https://perma.cc/VAP5-SWQ6]. 
 42. Press Release, Metro Pictures, Trevor Paglen: A Study of Invisible Images, 
http://www.metropictures.com/exhibitions/trevor-paglen4/press-release 
[https://perma.cc/5AZC-JH94] (“To make the prints in Adversarially Evolved 
Hallucinations, Paglen trained an AI to recognize images associated with taxonomies 
such as omens and portents, monsters, and dreams.  A second AI worked in tandem 
with the first to generate the eerie, beautiful images that speak to the exuberant 
promises and dark undercurrents characterizing our increasingly automated world.”). 
 43. Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-
sentencing [https://perma.cc/QBM7-S29B]. 
 44. Emotion AI Overview, AFFECTIVA, https://www.affectiva.com/emotion-ai-
overview/ [https://perma.cc/F285-8PPX]. 
 45. For a more thorough definition of machine learning, see David Lehr & Paul 
Ohm, Playing with the Data: What Legal Scholars Should Learn About Machine 
Learning, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653, 671 (2017) (“[M]achine learning refers to an 
automated process of discovering correlations (sometimes alternatively referred to as 
relationships or patterns) between variables in a dataset, often to make predictions or 
estimates of some outcome.”). 
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Not only can AI systems “predict” outcomes that directly affect 
humans, but they can also create new content.46  For example, an AI 
system can write novels, news articles, and, hypothetically, a court 
opinion or law review article.47  An AI system can create works of art 
or music and produce patentable inventions.48  Programmers 
pursuing writing applications for AI would train the system using 
datasets that teach it the structure of language, such as the 
interrelationships between subjects, verbs, and objects, and how 
particular words have congregated together previously.49  A data 
trainer might accomplish this by exposing an AI system to a dataset 
containing written materials pertaining to a specific field, or a more 
generalized set of works.50  A programmer designing an AI system 
that composes jazz music would expose it to a vast catalog of existing 
jazz recordings, which the system would break down into tiny 
electronic signals to learn the statistical correlations between different 
notes.51  With this knowledge, the system can create new melodies 
that match the trajectories of preexisting ones, without “copying” 
earlier works.52 
Following this initial teaching phase, the trainer must give the AI 
system feedback.53  Here, the trainer will introduce new pieces of 
information and ask the AI system to identify its parameters.54  The 
 
 46. Matthew Hutson, How Google Is Making Music with Artificial Intelligence, 
SCI. MAG. (Aug. 8, 2017, 3:40 PM), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/08/how-
google-making-music-artificial-intelligence [https://perma.cc/NA5B-TQHB]. 
 47. Joe Keohane, What News-Writing Bots Means for the Future of Journalism, 
WIRED (Feb. 16, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2017/02/robots-wrote-this-
story/ [https://perma.cc/TJ7Q-LZYG]. 
 48. See Yanisky-Ravid & Liu, supra note 12, at 2224–26; Yanisky-Ravid, supra 
note 29, at 663. 
 49. Danny Lewis, An AI-Written Novella Almost Won a Literary Prize, 
SMITHSONIAN (Mar. 28, 2016), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/ai-
written-novella-almost-won-literary-prize-180958577/ [https://perma.cc/G9UW-
YYV7]. 
 50. Ngram Viewer, GOOGLE BOOKS, 
http://storage.googleapis.com/books/ngrams/books/datasetsv2.html 
[https://perma.cc/3VLQ-KSVX]. 
 51. To listen to jazz produced by AI systems and understand how it works, see 
Episode 51: AI and Intellectual Property Law, Featuring Prof. Shlomit Yanisky-
Ravid, FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J., PODCAST (May 3, 2018) 
(downloaded using iTunes) [hereinafter AI and IP Law Fordham Podcast]; see also 
MILLION SONG DATASET, https://labrosa.ee.columbia.edu/millionsong/ 
[https://perma.cc/R2DN-W7XG] (2011). 
 52. AI and IP Law Fordham Podcast, supra note 51. 
 53. See Lehr & Ohm, supra note 45, at 684–88. 
 54. Id. at 685. 
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trainer will indicate when the system is correct and when it is wrong.55  
This feedback phase allows the AI system to hone in on its ultimate 
objectives, increasing the system’s accuracy and efficiency.56  Even 
once the system is publicly released, trainers can continue to refine 
the AI system by continuing to correct its errors, resulting in a 
feedback loop that continuously improves the AI systems’ utility.57 
Products of machine learning that depend on massive amounts of 
collected data promise to transform society.  Such systems will not 
only have the capacity to predict results and meet objectives, but also 
be able to reform and reshape us.58  For example, consider an AI 
system that presents a mix of news stories to a user, but as that user 
clicks on particular kinds of stories, the system alters the types of 
news stories it chooses to present to the user.59  Over time, the system 
will learn that user’s preferences and will thus reflect the news stories 
that the algorithm chooses to show the user.60  Undoubtedly, the 
potential effects of this feedback loop are significant, as different 
members of society could develop dramatically different conceptions 
of the communal status quo.  This capacity to shape opinion and 
perspective is precisely the reason that the workings of AI systems 
must be closely examined, lest there be some glitch or unseemly detail 
that could be used to trick and manipulate.61  This latter concern is 
particularly important considering the Transparency Model discussed 
here.  AI systems can also perpetuate disparities in employment: 
They can judge applicants and determine who should be offered a job 
 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 696–97 (describing the “tuning process”). 
 57. Id. at 699–700. 
 58. See Cohen, supra note 6, at 1925. 
 59. Julia Angwin, On Google, a Political Mystery that’s All Numbers, WALL ST. J. 
(Nov. 4, 2012, 5:09 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203347104578099122530080836 
[https://perma.cc/2FAT-67VD] (noting an increased likelihood that a Google News 
user who searched for “Obama” will receive more news regarding Iran, compared to 
a user who searched for “Romney”). 
 60. This mechanism is not unlike movie or clip recommendations created by 
algorithms for Netflix or Youtube users.  See Libby Plummer, This Is How Netflix’s 
Top-Secret Recommendation System Works, WIRED (Aug. 22, 2017), 
https://www.wired.co.uk/article/how-do-netflixs-algorithms-work-machine-learning-
helps-to-predict-what-viewers-will-like [https://perma.cc/EC9K-GSR2]. 
 61. Jihii Jolly, How Algorithms Decide the News You See, COLUM. JOURNALISM 
REV. (May 20, 2014), 
https://archives.cjr.org/news_literacy/algorithms_filter_bubble.php 
[https://perma.cc/PR78-24TM]. 
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or which employees deserve promotions.62  An AI system designed to 
predict who will be a successful employee, or who should receive a 
promotion, will be able to do so only after the programmer trains it 
using historical hiring and promoting data.  But this kind of 
application risks perpetuating and extending historical disparities in 
employment, rather than ameliorating them. 
In summary, AI systems can learn to perform any number of tasks 
typically carried out by humans.  Once AI systems are exposed to 
massive amounts of data, they can analyze preexisting datasets, 
associate variables and attributes with positive and negative 
outcomes, and use these associations to predict, create, and decide.  
Through feedback, AI systems can learn from their own mistakes, 
improve performance, and identify more conclusive drivers of 
positive outcomes.  But the success and reliability of AI systems 
depends on the kind and quality of the underlying data they are 
trained on.  AI systems can reach undesirable social outcomes if their 
harmful results are deemed “positive matches” by the system because 
of faulty datasets, because they were not properly trained, or because 
of a lack oversight. 
II. THE LEGAL CHALLENGES AND HURDLES OF USING BIG DATA: 
THE THREAT OF DISCRIMINATORY OUTCOMES AND PRIVACY 
VIOLATIONS 
One of the main goals of this Article is to identify areas where 
using unevaluated datasets to train AI systems could lead to 
undesirable public policy outcomes.  Because of the opaque nature of 
how AI systems function, it is often difficult (if not impossible) to 
determine the harms that result from using discriminatory, illegal, and 
unethical datasets after the fact.  That being the case, this Part of the 
Article forms the basis for our recommendation that data providers 
for AI systems within the industry must take active steps to scrutinize 
and audit the quality of the datasets they use to train their AI 
systems.  This kind of scrutiny early in the process is tremendously 
important, especially when the AI industry is mainly controlled by 
massive firms which are dominant in the market and have ongoing 
 
 62. For an economic study of a machine learning tool meant to predict the 
productivity of teachers and police officers, see Aaron Chalfin et al., Productivity and 
Selection of Human Capital with Machine Learning, 106 AM. ECON. REV. 124, 124–
26 (2016). 
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access to massive quantities of data.63  Moreover, where datasets are 
subject to buy and sell agreements, or where firms retain exclusive 
rights over datasets, there is a significant risk that the interests of the 
public will not align with the goals of the entity using the data.64 
This Part describes two areas where a faultily-composed dataset 
used to train AI systems could spur adverse outcomes.  Section II.A 
explores the ways in which partial, incomplete, wrong, or biased data 
can lead to discriminatory or illegal outcomes.  It demonstrates that 
when AI is used in economic sectors where discrimination triggers 
liability, there is a clear need to ensure that the data is “clean.”  
Section II.B considers how privacy requirements can pose significant 
obstacles to the development of AI systems and demonstrates the 
importance of instituting a Privacy by Design framework to ensure 
that privacy concerns are respected at all stages of the AI system’s 
development, especially at the training phase.65 
A. Discriminatory Data 
1. AI and Discriminatory Data 
There are many ways in which AI systems can create 
discriminatory outcomes by relying on “bad” data; this is becoming 
more and more a pressing problem, because unsurprisingly AI 
systems play constantly growing roles in areas of the economy where 
Congress prohibits discrimination.66  AI systems, for example, 
conduct background checks for employment.67  They evaluate tenants 
 
 63. MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., supra note 1, at 6 (noting that companies at the 
“digital frontier” — online firms and digital natives such as Google and Baidu — 
invested an estimated $20 billion to $30 billion in AI development in 2016). 
 64. See, e.g., infra notes 179–181 and accompanying text. 
 65. It is of note that the discussion herein, regarding adverse outcomes that result 
from problematic datasets, is not meant to be exhaustive — there are many other 
problems that arise from faulty data, such as potential copyright violations of 
material contained within a dataset. 
 66. For a discussion on the logic of anti-discrimination legislation, see generally 
Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination 
Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2000). 
 67. Brian Blum, Intelligo Gives Background Checks The AI Treatment, 
ISRAEL21C (July 17, 2018), https://www.israel21c.org/intelligo-gives-background-
checks-the-ai-treatment/ [https://perma.cc/46N3-NVYM] (“Indeed, AI shines the 
brightest when it can make connections and identify patterns in the way that only a 
machine can . . . . Another AI advantage: it can check and recheck a target’s 
background automatically, ensuring that any red flags on individuals or companies 
are discovered in real time.”). 
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who apply for leases.68  They determine a person’s creditworthiness, 
and even predict future terrorist and criminal conduct.69  In each of 
these examples, the objective of the AI system is to distinguish 
between “safe” people and those to avoid.70  Hence, AI systems have 
become powerful filtering tools, sorting and categorizing persons in 
many areas, and their influence and dominance will surely continue to 
grow in significant and unpredictable ways.  How AI systems 
accomplish these sorting tasks depends in large part on the data used 
by the data providers to train them.  The data providers must identify 
for the AI system examples of good employees, tenants, or debtors.71  
Implicitly, the AI system will have to decide what personal traits 
make certain candidates undesirable.72  In order to avoid running 
afoul of anti-discrimination laws, data providers must ensure that the 
variables contained within the datasets pertain specifically to the job 
at hand and do not contain biased, illegal, or irrelevant characteristics 
such as gender, race, or sexual orientation.73 
On a more abstract level, AI developers may need to evaluate who 
gets to define the characteristics of a good employee or tenant.  For 
example, Barocas and Selbst demonstrate the interests and stakes 
that policymakers must consider in the context of employment 
discrimination.74  To reduce the probability that AI systems might 
illegally discriminate against potential employees, Barocas and Selbst 
have identified potential stakeholders who might be able to tackle 
this crucial problem, such as the employer or an auditor like the 
EEOC or a private third party.75  They also identify numerous 
obstacles: the question of whether the employer has collected data, or 
 
 68. See, e.g., NABORLY, https://naborly.com/ [https://perma.cc/9BAV-HAXT]. 
 69. See, e.g., ZEST FINANCE, https://www.zestfinance.com/ 
[https://perma.cc/KR7D-5NDQ]; see also supra notes 2 and 3. 
 70. See generally Desai & Kroll, supra note 28. 
 71. See Lehr & Ohm, supra note 45, at 672–73. 
 72. Id. at 665 (“If programmers specify output variables in ways that make 
members of certain demographic groups more likely than others to have 
‘advantageous’ outcomes, discrimination can be introduced.”). 
 73. It is worth mentioning that anti-discrimination statutes do seem to imply that 
AI operators should choose unbiased datasets that do not result in unequal, 
prejudicial outcomes.  See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 19, at 694–714.  However, 
legal obstacles, such as trade secret protections, make it very difficult to actually 
achieve the goals of  
non-discriminatory data.  See generally Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade 
Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1343 
(2018) (discussing how trade secrets prevent scrutinizing sentencing algorithms and 
other uses of AI in the criminal justice system). 
 74. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 19, at 694–714. 
 75. Id. at 718–19. 
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if it resorted to data collected by third parties; whether the model 
used is internally developed, or if it was purchased from a third 
party.76  They note that third parties that specialize in human 
resources may prove more than able to audit the employment 
decisions made by AI models.77 
2. Disparate Impact 
Numerous federal statutes prohibit discrimination.78  There are two 
main types of unlawful discrimination: intentional discrimination and 
disparate impact.79  Disparate impact claims arise where a policy, 
although facially neutral, creates a statistical imbalance that adversely 
impacts a protected group:80 
Disparate impact is not concerned with the intent or motive for a 
policy; where it applies the doctrine first asks whether there is a 
disparate impact on members of a protected class, then whether 
there is some business justification for that impact, and finally, 
whether there were less discriminatory means of achieving the same 
result.81 
Under a theory of disparate impact, a plaintiff need not 
demonstrate any animus on the part of the defendant.82  Instead, all 
the standard requires is that a protected group is disproportionately 
affected by a practice or policy relative to other groups.83  There are 
generally four elements to a disparate impact claim: (1) statistical 
imbalances that indicate an adverse impact on a protected group, 
caused by (2) a facially neutral policy, (3) which was “artificial, 
arbitrary, and unnecessary,” supported by (4) factual allegations that 
 
 76. Id. 
 77. See id. 
 78. See Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, Gender Pay Gap: Blaming the Victims — Are 
Women Responsible?!, in NYU ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 91, 96–103 (67th 
ed. 2015) (reviewing antidiscrimination legislations regarding gender and the gender 
pay gap) (on file with author). 
 79. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, 
Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2513 (2015) (noting the distinction between disparate treatment 
and disparate impact). 
 80. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 19, at 694. 
 81. Id. 
 82. See id. at 701. 
 83. See id.; see also Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. at 2518 
(“[A]ntidiscrimination laws must be construed to encompass disparate-impact claims 
when their text refers to the consequences of actions and not just to the mindset of 
actors, and where that interpretation is consistent with statutory purpose.”). 
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indicate a “robust causation” between the policy and the disparity.84  
When these elements are met, it is possible to demonstrate 
discrimination through statistical analysis by showing that a facially 
neutral policy resulted in a disparate impact.85 
The U.S. government regulates discrimination by economic sector 
and heightens prohibitions in specific contexts such as employment, 
housing, and consumer finance.86  The Fair Housing Act of 1968 
(FHA), for example, prohibits discrimination in the buying or selling 
of homes on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or 
national origin.”87  The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967 (ADEA) prohibits discrimination against people over the age of 
forty in employment decisions.88  There are many other anti-
discrimination statutes in various areas of American jurisprudence 
that read very similarly to the FHA or ADEA.89  The overarching 
ideology behind these statutes is that the characteristics of a person 
belonging to a protected group ought to be irrelevant to the selection, 
evaluation, or compensation of that person; by making those factors 
irrelevant, the law can eliminate “stubborn but irrational prejudice.”90  
It is worth noting that the statutes mentioned above prohibit both 
intentional discrimination and practices that produce disparate 
impacts.91 
While there has not been extensive litigation regarding AI systems 
and discrimination, existing cases make clear that decision-makers are 
 
 84. See, e.g., Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. at 2522–24; see also Robert G. 
Schwemm, Fair Housing Litigation After Inclusive Communities: What’s New and 
What’s Not, 115 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 106 (2015), 
https://columbialawreview.org/content/fair-housing-litigation-after-inclusive-
communities-whats-new-and-whats-not/ [https://perma.cc/9GD6-H7VX]. 
 85. See generally Yanisky-Ravid, supra note 78. 
 86. See infra notes 87–90. 
 87. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1988). 
 88. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 623, 631 (2016); see also Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., 544 
U.S. 228, 232 (2005) (noting that Congress enacted the ADEA in response to a report 
from the Department of Labor, which stated that arbitrary discrimination on the 
basis of age was occurring). 
 89. See George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact, Discrimination, and the 
Essentially Contested Concept of Equality, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2313, 2318 (2006); 
Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination & Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642, 643 
(2001) (“The canonical idea of ‘antidiscrimination’ in the United States condemns the 
differential treatment of otherwise similarly situated individuals on the basis of race, 
sex, national origin, or other protected characteristic.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 90. Lam v. Univ. of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551, 1563 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Post, supra 
note 66, at 10. 
 91. See Rutherglen, supra note 89, at 2330–31 (2006). See generally Schwemm, 
supra note 84. 
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prohibited by law from using a variable that is irrelevant to job 
performance and produces disparate impacts.  When the 
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transit Authority’s police department 
instituted minimum running speed requirements, ostensibly to 
increase the quality of the police force, a district court struck those 
requirements down on the basis of their disparate impact on women 
applicants.92  A fire department was prohibited from considering 
personal contacts and familial relationships when evaluating 
candidates because of the negative disparate effect this would have on 
black candidates.93  These kinds of prohibitions are reminiscent of AI 
systems that evaluate social media accounts for tenants or run 
employment background checks.94  Existing precedent logically 
extends to prohibit utilizing variables that have a disparate impact on 
protected groups in creating, developing and relying upon machine 
learning systems as decision-makers. 
These cases demonstrate that biased results can occur despite any 
explicit reference to a protected group, and this should concern AI 
system operators who work in regulated sectors.  ZestFinance, a 
lending company that has an AI system to determine whether 
someone should receive a loan, serves as a good example of how the 
cases described above can apply to AI when the system relies on new 
datapoints.95  Its system is trained to flag when potential clients 
quickly scroll through the terms and conditions and interprets 
someone who divulges their social media connections as a riskier 
applicant than someone who does not.96  These attributes may or may 
not be good indicators of creditworthiness — scrolling through terms 
and conditions, and the speed at which you do so, could be a function 
of any number of variables, such as device type, education level, or 
financial desperation. 
 
 92. Jolls, supra note 89, at 656–57 (discussing Lanning v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 
181 F.3d 478 (3d Cir. 1999)). 
 93. Id. at 657 (discussing Banks v. City of Albany, 953 F. Supp. 28, 33–36 
(N.D.N.Y 1997)). 
 94. See generally Blum, supra note 67.  Consider Fama, for example, a company 
that purports to be able to utilize AI to “identify threats related to sexual harassment, 
discrimination, theft of sensitive information, or other types of people risk that could 
destabilize your organization,” or to provide “role specific screening packages [that] 
can help you identify those individuals likely to excel in the organization.”  Product 
Overview, FAMA, https://www.fama.io/product-overview/ [https://perma.cc/9MFF-
FF63]. 
 95. See Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 21, at 164–65. 
 96. See id. 
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3. The Impact of Bad Data: Biased, Partial, or Wrong 
When the training data is unrepresentative of the environment it 
will operate in, discriminatory outcomes can occur.  This can come 
about through a host of issues.  The dataset itself may be over-
inclusive or under-inclusive of certain segments of the population, 
creating sample-size issues that produce disparate impacts.97  The 
dataset could contain preexisting biases that lead the AI system to 
inherit society’s biases, habits, and beliefs, and perpetuate already 
persisting discrimination.98  For example, consider an AI system 
meant to predict the likelihood of an employee’s future success by 
learning from the dataset of previous achievements.  The dataset of 
those previous achievements “might be tilted against minorities given 
their lack of past success because of a harsh work environment 
resulting from discriminatory attitudes, or the lack of minority hiring 
altogether.”99  Not only does this AI system rely on faulty data, the 
context in which the data was collected and the present circumstances 
may have changed dramatically, reducing the predictive worth of the 
dataset.100  “Confounding covariates,” such as the use of ZIP codes to 
predict the worthiness of applicants, can drive an AI system to 
produce racist outcomes, even though the system was never taught 
what race is.101  Also known as proxies or “redundant encodings,” 
confounding covariates can render significant efforts to counteract 
discrimination wholly ineffective, and ultimately produce disparate 
impacts.102  In other words, relying on confounding covariates raises 
the possibility that AI systems could resort to making decisions based 
on a datapoint that disproportionately harms one group over another, 
even if the AI system was never taught concepts of race, gender, 
sexuality, age, or other protected characteristics. 
Bad data can also lead to faulty decision-making processes and 
conclusions.103  In particular, missing and inaccurate data can 
 
 97. See id. at 171. 
 98. See Batya Friedman & Helen Nissenbuam, Bias in Computer Systems, 14 
ACM TRANSACTIONS ON INFO. SYSTEMS 330 (1996). 
 99. Tal Z. Zarsky, Understanding Discrimination in the Scored Society, 89 WASH. 
L. REV. 1375, 1392 (2014). 
 100. See Lehr & Ohm, supra note 45, at 684–85. 
 101. See Zarsky, supra note 99, at 1394–95. 
 102. See Anupam Chander, The Racist Algorithm?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1023, 1036–
37 (2017). 
 103. See generally James T. Graves et al., Big Data and Bad Data: On the 
Sensitivity of Security Policy to Imperfect Information, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 117 (2016) 
(discussing the myriad ways that bad data leads to bad decisions in the security 
context). 
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potentially lead an AI system to draw invalid inferences.104  For 
example, consider a machine learning algorithm that evaluates 
applications to higher education institutions.  Historically 
underrepresented minorities at colleges and universities may be 
denied admission simply because of their preexisting lack of 
representation in the data sample.  The same can be said for non-
traditional applicants with uncommon life trajectories.  These kinds of 
historically underrepresented applicants may not be evaluated as 
holistically by an AI system as they would be by a human admissions 
officer.  In the best-case scenario, over time those errors would be 
corrected by the machine learning algorithm’s feedback loop.  But 
even in that situation, there would nonetheless remain a potentially 
lengthy interim period where invalid inferences are drawn from 
lacking data inputs.  By requiring real transparency of the sources of 
the data, such problems could be reduced or avoided.105  Under the 
Transparency Model proposed here, the data provider has to critically 
scrutinize the data they use to train the AI system and ensure that it 
will not continue to perpetuate historically discriminatory imbalances. 
4. Discrimination in the Feedback 
AI systems can be taught to reach discriminatory or biased 
conclusions not only from faulty underlying datasets, but also during 
the feedback phase.  This can occur in two ways: through a 
transmission of the trainer’s biases, or through a failure on the part of 
the trainer to correct the AI’s mistakes.  The former of these is not 
the consequence of the AI system or the underlying data as much as it 
is on the shoulders of discriminatory human conduct.  However 
nefarious this conduct is, it is not as relevant to the scope of this work.  
In the latter case, the AI system learns using a dataset that is not per 
se discriminatory — it is the process used to teach the system that 
causes it to produce biased results.  The trainer may adjust the 
algorithm to match the dataset in such a way that it “overfits” the 
dataset, forcing the AI system to create arbitrary connections that 
result from the randomness of the feedback it received.106  In such a 
case, the AI system creates rather than identifies patterns in ways that 
do not recognize proper cause and effect, inferring false 
interrelationships between variables that are, in fact, not related at all. 
 
 104. See id. at 119–20. 
 105. See Zarsky, supra note 99, at 1395. 
 106. See Lehr & Ohm, supra note 45, at 714. 
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5. Unmoored and Independent AI Systems that Autonomously 
Seek Data 
The feature that most distinguishes AI systems from traditional 
algorithms is their independence: AI systems are capable of searching 
for new relevant datasets from areas such as social networks, internet 
sites, blogs, and other data that exists online.107  Therefore, once in 
operation, an AI system can become unleashed from and move 
beyond its original training data as it collects new information.  An 
unrestrained AI system can create what is known as “arbitrariness by 
algorithm” — it might predict outcomes based on inferences, 
correlations, and groupings of different individuals together according 
to data found online, which might be filled with arbitrary and 
misleading datapoints.108  Consider, for example, a data provider that 
initially exposes and trains an AI system to hire or promote 
employees without considering gender or race.  As the AI system 
continues to evolve on its own, receiving employee data regarding 
hiring and promotions, it could begin to identify other factors such as 
whether employees play football or dance ballet.  Because these other 
characteristics are often tied to race, gender, sexuality, class, and the 
like, these unrelated variables might lead the system to become 
biased on the basis of these characteristics, which will ultimately 
result in biased outcomes.  Even though anti-discrimination statutes 
clearly prohibit AI data providers and trainers from teaching an AI 
system to purposely discriminate, that the system will autonomously 
become prejudicial is a very real possibility — one that falls within the 
parameters of anti-discrimination legislation because of the disparate 
impact that the AI system would ultimately produce.109 
6. From Theory to Practice: The Inability of Existing Laws to 
Control AI Systems 
While it is theoretically possible that the disparate impact doctrine 
could apply broadly to improperly assembled datasets, there is reason 
to conclude that it may not.  Perhaps the AI system operator could 
escape liability by claiming a business necessity, a defense to disparate 
impact that arises where the practice at issue is the only way of 
 
 107. See Yanisky-Ravid & Liu, supra note 12, at 2223–29. 
 108. See Zarsky, supra note 99, at 1408–09. 
 109. See Friedman & Nissenbuam, supra note 98, at 330, 335 (discussing 
“Emergent Bias” that arises from the use of the computer system, rather than being 
preexisting or technical). 
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accomplishing a worthwhile objective.110  In the case of an AI 
operator, she might demonstrate that the data used to train the AI 
system contained necessary variables related to the AI’s objective, 
thereby potentially defeating a disparate impact claim.111  Barocas 
and Selbst argue, for example, that the collection of vast amounts of 
data to use in the employment context is not effectively counteracted 
by the requirements of anti-discrimination legislation in the 
employment sector.112  Additionally, the disparate impact doctrine 
cannot address the myriad issues that are likely to arise from faulty 
data in AI — the doctrine has been relegated to specific practices 
such as employment, housing, and lending practices.113  Besides, 
many practices can produce outcomes that may not rise to prohibited 
discrimination but nonetheless offend society.  For example, one 
study demonstrated that, when a user’s “ad preference settings were 
set to female, a user saw ‘fewer instances of an ad related to high-
paying jobs than [when preferences were set] to male,’” 
demonstrating that somewhere in the system, the AI made a biased 
connection between higher earnings and male job applicants.114 
It is vital to recognize that even though these problems are 
detrimental to society and risk increasing inequality, it is possible to 
train AI systems to reduce the potential for bias.115  Rather than 
perpetuating existing biases and disparities, an AI system could learn 
to avoid such outcomes by being taught to identify where bias or 
discrimination may be driving particular decisions.116  One AI system 
could even audit another to “ensure that [data] is used only for its 
intended purpose,” and to “identify algorithmic outcomes that are 
unfair and discriminatory.”117 
 
 110. See Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., 544 U.S. 228, 244 (2005) (explaining the 
business necessity defense). 
 111. See Lehr & Ohm, supra note 45, at 666. 
 112. See generally Barocas & Selbst, supra note 19. 
 113. See Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA 
L. REV. 701, 704–05 (2006) (arguing that the disparate impact doctrine has had 
limited impact). 
 114. Desai & Kroll, supra note 28, at 17–18. 
 115. Lehr & Ohm, supra note 45, at 704–05. 
 116. Philip Hacker & Bilyana Petkova, Reining in the Big Promise of Big Data: 
Transparency, Inequality, and New Regulatory Frontiers, 15 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. 
PROP. 1, 13 (2017) (describing anecdotal evidence of Amazon charging higher prices 
for Mac users than Windows users, suggesting that because the average Mac user is 
wealthier than a PC user, income inequality is reduced). 
 117. Andrea Scripa Els, Note, Artificial Intelligence as a Digital Privacy Protector, 
31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 217, 224 (2017). 
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7. Examples and Consequences of Discriminatory Behavior by AI 
Systems 
In 2016, Microsoft released Tay, its new social media AI system, 
with great fanfare.118  Less than a day later, Microsoft apologized and 
removed Tay from Twitter.119  During that single day, Tay had 
learned how to be racist, genocidal, and a white supremacist.120  As it 
turns out, “a small subset” of Twitter users “exploited a vulnerability” 
in the program,121 apparently a problematic “repeat after me” 
function.122  Though this may seem like an isolated incident, it is 
hardly the only instance of misbehavior.123 It also highlights the 
broader risks regarding artificial intelligence and discrimination.124 
Furthermore, while Tay is an obvious example of how AI 
applications can malfunction if given the wrong training data (i.e. 
speech by online trolls125), in other instances it is much more difficult 
to trace whether the undesired result came from a discriminatory 
dataset or a prejudicial trainer.  For example, consider an algorithm 
 
 118. Abby Ohlheiser, Trolls Turned Tay, Microsoft’s Fun Millennial AI Bot, Into a 
Genocidal Maniac, WASH. POST (Mar. 25, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2016/03/24/the-internet-
turned-tay-microsofts-fun-millennial-ai-bot-into-a-genocidal-maniac/ 
[https://perma.cc/K6XZ-SVY5]. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Peter Lee, Learning from Tay’s Introduction, OFFICIAL MICROSOFT BLOG 
(Mar. 25, 2016), https://blogs.microsoft.com/blog/2016/03/25/learning-tays-
introduction/ [https://perma.cc/CT9A-VYHJ]. 
 122. Ohlheiser, supra note 118. 
 123. See Jana Kasperkevic, Google Says Sorry for Racist Auto-Tag in Photo App, 
GUARDIAN (July 1, 2015), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/01/google-sorry-racist-auto-tag-
photo-app [https://perma.cc/SUY9-XJC3]; Matt Day, How LinkedIn’s Search Engine 
May Reflect a Gender Bias, SEATTLE TIMES (Aug. 31, 2016), 
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/microsoft/how-linkedins-search-engine-may-
reflect-a-bias/ [https://perma.cc/F3U2-HVZZ]. 
 124. See Stephen Buranyi, Rise of the Racist Robots — How AI Is Learning All 
Our Worst Impulses, GUARDIAN (Aug. 8, 2017), 
https://www.theguardian.com/inequality/2017/aug/08/rise-of-the-racist-robots-how-ai-
is-learning-all-our-worst-impulses [https://perma.cc/D3VK-ND5G]; Christina Couch, 
Ghosts in the Machine, PBS (Oct. 25, 2017), 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/next/tech/ai-bias/ [https://perma.cc/WUP9-JBRD]; 
Sophia Chen, AI Research Is in Desperate Need of an Ethical Watchdog, WIRED 
(Sept. 18, 2017), https://www.wired.com/story/ai-research-is-in-desperate-need-of-an-
ethical-watchdog/ [https://perma.cc/T6BS-MYYU]. 
 125. A troll is someone who “antagonize[s] (others) online by deliberately posting 
inflammatory, irrelevant, or offensive comments or other disruptive content.” Troll, 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER (Online ed. 2019), https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/troll [https://perma.cc/2L8Q-5948]. 
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that decides SAT prep courses should cost twice as much in Asian-
majority communities than others — is it doing so because those 
communities are Asian, or for some other reason?126  What if a 
disparity occurs because of the underlying sample size, such as facial 
recognition applications that identify white male faces much more 
effectively than women and other races?127 
Discriminatory outcomes pose both legal and reputational dangers 
to AI systems operators.  Where statutes prohibit business practices 
that cause a disparate impact for protected groups without a valid 
reason, such as a business necessity defense, an AI operator should 
ensure that its systems are run in compliance with those statutes.  
Additionally, the specter of discrimination can also lead to serious 
reputational damage, which should incentivize AI operators to 
consider possible vulnerabilities in their AI training process that 
could produce discriminatory outcomes. 
The above sections demonstrate how exposing an AI system to 
biased, incomplete, or wrong data can result in discrimination.  As AI 
systems become cheaper to implement and more widely used, these 
risks will increase.  Technology firms should consider these risks when 
developing AI systems and avoid inappropriate uses of data that may 
violate anti-discrimination laws or result in an AI malfunction that 
could damage their reputation.  The Transparency Model would help 
increase public trust by educating users, and incentivize the industry 
to scrutinize and verify the data its AI systems depend on. 
There is one significant barrier to understanding how and when it is 
more likely for an AI system to produce discriminatory results: lack 
of transparency.  Currently, consumers are unable to know with 
certainty whether a given negative outcome resulted from an AI 
system built on biased data, or due to some other reason.  The next 
section examines how we can resolve this issue by grounding the 
public’s right to an explanation in a right to privacy.  Privacy rights 
function both as a means to understanding whether discrimination is 
occurring, and as an end in themselves so that individuals can 
confidently ascertain whether private information about them is being 
misused in ways that they did not foresee.  By encouraging 
 
 126. Julia Angwin & Jeff Larson, The Tiger Mom Tax: Asians Are Nearly Twice as 
Likely to Get a Higher Price from Princeton Review, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 1, 2015), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/asians-nearly-twice-as-likely-to-get-higher-price-
from-princeton-review [https://perma.cc/ZGY6-SE3G]. 
 127. See Couch, supra note 124 (discussing the popular benchmark Labeled Faces 
in the Wild used by many well-known tech firms to measure algorithm performance 
for facial recognition and the lack of diversity in the sample). 
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transparency and scrutiny of AI systems, the Transparency Model can 
help consumers hold operators accountable, such that they will better 
prevent discriminatory results and avoid privacy violations. 
B. Data and Privacy: Invasive and Pervasive Data 
The ways that AI trainers use data pertaining to individuals 
invariably raises privacy concerns.  Individuals are not always aware 
of the sheer magnitude of data that others possess about them, and 
therefore likely are not aware of how this data is used by AI systems.  
Privacy plays a pivotal role in the Transparency Model for two 
interlocking reasons.  For one, transparency would incentivize the AI 
industry to avoid violating societal privacy expectations.  Conjointly, 
transparency can empower individuals to better control their data, 
and will enable them to advocate for their data privacy more 
effectively. 
AI systems cannot reliably function without the huge amounts of 
data used to train them.  At present, there is no shortage of data that 
relates to the most personal details about almost all people.128  Some 
companies, such as Acxiom, make data available to individual users 
without a special request; others, such as Facebook, require that 
consumers send  requests specifically to Facebook before it will 
release the data it has collected on them.129  Consumers are often 
unaware of the detailed information that AI system operators 
possess, which is drawn from multiple sources.  This creates two 
layers of secrecy: Not only do consumers not know what data exists, 
but they also do not know how AI systems use it.  Thus, consumers 
cannot opt out of being “judged” by a computer, nor are they able to 
control the information that others hold about them.  This section 
explores the role that privacy can play in helping policymakers craft a 
response to the proliferation of AI in all aspects of our society.  
Following this analysis of privacy, Part III discusses the Transparency 
Model in detail, which will help educate consumers and incentivize AI 
system operators (and others) to consider what types of data they 
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https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/11/technology/facebook-privacy-hearings.html 
[https://perma.cc/D48E-UETK]. 
 129. Compare ABOUT THE DATA BY ACXIOM, https://aboutthedata.com/portal 
[https://perma.cc/EBA6-BLM9], with Louise Matsakis, What to Look for in Your 
Facebook Data — And How to Find It, WIRED (Mar. 28, 2018), 
https://www.wired.com/story/download-facebook-data-how-to-read/ 
[https://perma.cc/HL3S-3TJY].                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
456 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLVI 
should use in training AI, and, on a more fundamental level, how 
much of that data they should use. 
Many scholars have recognized that privacy is difficult to define as 
a legal concept.130  For purposes of this Article, the notion of privacy 
focuses on the psychological aspects of the term and, more 
specifically, the perceived personal “balloon,” or a private sphere, 
which centers on autonomy, freedom, and the creation of 
relationships.131  Accordingly, this Article envisions privacy in a 
unique way by relying on the conceptual balloon of privacy that 
surrounds each and every one of us.132 
Efforts to regulate data collection and to protect privacy have 
recently become more commonplace and comprehensive.  The 
European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), 
which took effect on May 25, 2018, calls for protecting privacy rights 
in the collection, use, and maintenance of individual data and imposes 
these same mandatory obligations on U.S. firms that have commercial 
relationships with European firms or citizens.133  The U.S. Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) and the Office of the Attorney General of 
California have recognized the importance of privacy and the need to 
design policies that protect privacy as part of the data industry’s inner 
processes of production, known as Privacy by Design.134 
 
 130. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REv. 393, 393 
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2012), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-
2019] FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457 
Privacy rights are also well-recognized in international law.  Article 
12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: “No one 
shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, 
home, or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honor and 
reputation.  Everyone has the right to the protection of the law 
against such interference or attacks.”135  This text is memorialized in 
Article 17 of the International Convention On Civil and Political 
Rights of 1966.136  Similarly, Article 8(1) of the European Convention 
on Human Rights ensures that “[e]veryone has the right to respect for 
his private and family life, his home and his correspondence,” and 
allows for interference with this heralded right to privacy in extremely 
limited circumstances.137 
One does not need to provide a precise definition of privacy or 
determine whether a right to privacy exists under U.S. law in order to 
advocate that American consumers are owed proper privacy 
protections.  For one, a reasonable expectation of privacy is justified 
through psychological approaches, such as the aforementioned 
balloon of privacy or the so-called Magnet Field Theory, which 
suggests that there is a sphere of privacy that always surrounds 
humans, even in cyberspace arenas such as social networks.138  
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Additionally, a reasonable right to privacy can be justified for 
efficiency reasons.139  Data breaches and the release or compromise 
of data induce anxiety in the subjects of that compromised data.140  
Under U.S. law, communal expectations of privacy can stem from 
statutes.141  However, individuals also have expectations to privacy 
that are normative in nature. 142  These stem from what people choose 
to divulge to others, and what they anticipate will happen to that 
information.  Those normative expectations can erode over time — as 
AI systems become more complex and more capable of drawing upon 
multiple sources of data to paint new pictures of who someone is as a 
person, it is worth exploring whether, and to what extent, AI systems 
violate both statutory requirements and normative expectations of 
privacy.143  Proper privacy protections depend primarily on two types 
of procedures: gaining informed consent for data collection, and the 
anonymization of collected data.144 
When AI systems use massive amounts of data drawn from 
multiple sources, the potential for privacy violations increases.  In 
certain areas of the economy, heightened data protections apply 
because policymakers decided that those specific fields warrant 
heightened privacy protections, which surmount other considerations 
such as the availability of cheaper products, or more efficient 
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services.145  In order to protect against violations of societal 
expectations of privacy, AI operators should make transparent the 
sorts of data they use to train AI systems, where the data was 
collected, how it is used, and how it is protected.  Further, AI 
operators ought to take steps to ensure that such private data is not 
misused in ways that can trample privacy expectations or produce 
unfair outcomes. 
1. AI and U.S. Privacy “Islands”: Healthcare, Finance, and 
Children 
This section discusses privacy in the context of “islands” of well-
protected rights under U.S. law.  First, we describe the advances to 
which AI systems have contributed in the healthcare and 
pharmaceutical industry and highlight the importance of data privacy 
in that arena.  Second, we discuss how statutes require privacy with 
respect to children and education and note that those requirements 
reduce the ability of AI systems to increase in prominence in that 
sector.  Third, we examine statutory requirements of privacy and 
disclosure in the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA).  Fourth, we 
identify general normative expectations of privacy and advocate for 
various manifestations of those expectations that AI trainers should 
consider when deciding what data to use in training AI systems. 
a. AI in the Healthcare Field 
The medical sector is bursting with developing AI systems.146  
Applications such as diabetes monitoring,147 medical image 
 
 145. See Yanisky-Ravid, supra note 131, at 99–101. 
 146. Daniel Faggella, Machine Learning Healthcare Applications — 2018 and 
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analysis,148 diagnosis of cancer and other illnesses,149 and 
individualized medicinal regimens150 are just the tip of the iceberg 
with respect to possible medical applications of AI.  One consultant 
estimates that AI systems could generate up to a hundred-billion 
dollars in annual value in the U.S. healthcare system alone.151  A 
McKinsey Global Institute publication stated that AI in healthcare 
could lead to quicker diagnoses, better treatment plans, and improved 
health insurance.152  One significant driver of AI development in this 
field has been the ability to collect more and more medical data.153  
One potential issue is whether the data collected is recorded in 
standardized formats — presently, much data is recorded 
idiosyncratically, according to the needs of the collector, limiting its 
potential use.154 Regulation of medical devices poses significant 
challenges to developers seeking to train AI systems with compliant 
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FORBES (July 27, 2016), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jenniferhicks/2016/07/27/artificial-intelligence-and-data-
driven-medicine/#740a31c73069 [https://perma.cc/U689-5M5Y]. 
 151. Jamie Cattell et al., How Big Data Can Revolutionize Pharmaceutical R&D, 
MCKINSEY (Apr. 2013), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/pharmaceuticals-and-
medical-products/our-insights/how-big-data-can-revolutionize-pharmaceutical-r-and-
d [https://perma.cc/977P-4ZPF]. 
 152. See MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., supra note 1, at 63. 
 153. ResearchKit & CareKit, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/researchkit/ 
[https://perma.cc/63E5-ZNU2]. 
 154. MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., supra note 1, at 64. 
2019] FORDHAM URB. L.J. 461 
data,155 so much so that AI systems have been created to reduce 
regulatory risk with medical data.156  This is still a nascent field, and 
its effectiveness is not set in stone.  Watson, IBM’s AI infrastructure, 
for example, has recommended incorrect cancer treatments at times 
and is often disagreed with by doctors around the world.157 
Congress passed the Healthcare Insurance Portability and 
Accessibility Act of 1996 (HIPAA) to address the issue of data 
privacy in the healthcare sector.158  There are two primary aspects of 
HIPAA: the Privacy Rule, which governs the content of data, and the 
Security Rule, which concerns how an entity protects data.159  The 
Privacy Rule regulates individually identifiable health information 
collected by healthcare providers.160  It lists situations where a 
healthcare provider may use or disclose health information, and 
requires protocols and procedures that protect health information 
from unauthorized access, use, or disclosure.161  The Privacy Rule is 
designed to balance individual privacy rights against the societal goals 
of “oversight, research, law enforcement, public health and safety.”162  
The Security Rule only applies to protected health information in 
electronic format, and has three central tenets — that the data is kept 
confidential, available to authorized persons only, and that the 
integrity of the data is assured.163  Unlike the Privacy Rule, “the 
Security Rule created the standards for ensuring that only those who 
should have access to [electronic protected health information] will in 
fact have access.”164 
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If an entity decides to use or disclose protected health information, 
it must do so only to the extent necessary, though there are numerous 
exceptions to that “minimum necessity” standard.165  Generally, the 
minimum necessity determination is conducted at a policy and 
procedure level, rather than for each distinct use or disclosure of 
protected health information.166  For example, a healthcare 
organization would identify persons and departments that require 
protected information and limit their access to the nature of the 
information needed.  Where the protected health information is 
electronic, HIPAA’s Security Rule requires reasonable 
administrative, technical and physical procedures to prevent 
unauthorized access, use, or disclosure of protected health 
information.167  For example, in 2017, Metro Community Provider 
Network agreed to pay a $400,000 fine following a data breach in one 
of its hospitals that resulted from failures to secure patients’ data and 
conduct a risk analysis, which would have revealed the glaring 
vulnerabilities in the hospital’s data security program.168 
For an AI system to be deployed in the healthcare context, the data 
that it is developed on must be HIPAA-compliant.169  For example, 
when IBM engages with Memorial Sloan Kettering to provide 
Watson to help diagnose tumors, the data used to train Watson on 
how to identify tumors must have been gathered in compliance with 
HIPAA.  However, HIPAA’s approach to privacy fails to address the 
issue of de-anonymization, as made possible by computing power and 
massive quantities of data.170  Consider an example from the mid-
1990s to demonstrate the fact that even anonymous information 
stripped of identifiers can easily be de-anonymized to reveal 
individuals within datasets.171  In Massachusetts, Group Insurance 
Company (“GIC”), a government agency, decided to release hospital 
records for every state employee in the government’s health 
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insurance program.172  While names, addresses, and social security 
numbers were stripped from the data, patients’ zip codes, birth dates, 
and sexes were not. 173  A graduate student purchased the voter rolls 
of Cambridge, Massachusetts (where the Governor of Massachusetts 
lived), which contained the names, addresses, zip code, birth date, and 
sex of every voter.174  By combining the voter dataset with the 
hospital dataset, the student was able to identify the Governor’s 
health records, including diagnoses and prescriptions.175  This 
illustrates the problem of relying on anonymity as a total solution to 
ensuring health privacy — whenever an AI system is trained using 
multiple datasets, there is a very real possibility that the system will 
combine the datasets and arrive at a new base of knowledge that 
violates the requirements of HIPAA.  One study concluded that 87% 
of the population can be uniquely identified merely with one’s zip 
code, birthdate, and sex.176  While other studies have found a slightly 
lower likelihood of identification,177 that there is still any heightened 
chance of identification is problematic.  It is vital to realize that the 
more data an AI system accumulates, the more likely it is that 
anonymous data can be de-anonymized. 
Considering that datasets may be combined, transferred, or split 
up, AI systems that operate in the healthcare space should make the 
sources of their data transparent.  This will give patients and other 
stakeholders the ability to determine whether anonymity is 
jeopardized and how medical data is used or transferred.  Absent 
such transparency, we risk the possibility that others may be able to 
match multiple datasets, dissect the datapoints, and quickly pinpoint a 
particular individual who should have remained anonymous. 
Two further issues bear special mention here.  First, AI systems 
trained to diagnose illnesses and diseases require huge amounts of 
historical medical data, which is usually held by and is accessible 
through large firms and entities, whose interests may not align with 
the public’s interests in welfare or privacy.178  This misalignment may 
be amplified when the data was collected by nonprofit organizations, 
such as public hospitals, and transferred to for-profit entities.179  In 
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these situations, the arrangement between the public seller and 
private buyer may contain exclusivity clauses, which would limit the 
ability of the public hospital to share the data with other actors 
(thereby potentially hurting public welfare), or grant the for-profit 
firm exclusive rights to determine when and how the data is 
transferred to third parties (thereby implicating privacy concerns).180  
These issues recently came to light following revelations of an 
agreement between the company Paige.AI and Memorial Sloan 
Kettering, regarding the use of millions of patient tissue slides, which 
Paige.AI would use to train AI systems to make diagnoses.181  
Through the use of this data, Paige.AI was able to obtain a market 
advantage over its competitors.182 
b. AI for Children and Education 
AI systems are not only used to diagnose diseases, hire employees, 
or predict creditworthiness.  They are also increasingly used in toys 
and applications for children.  Recently, a doll developed by Mattel 
that included an AI system was withdrawn from the market following 
privacy concerns regarding the effect it would have on child 
development.183  Another doll outfitted with an AI system can 
apparently read children’s emotions,184 while other systems can tutor 
children.185  Video games, a source of entertainment for millions of 
children, are rife with AI programs that can create characters, adjust 
the trajectory of the game to match the child’s response, and shape 
the child’s understanding of the world.186  In millions of homes, AI 
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systems are on standby, waiting for a child to ask them a question.187  
Depending on the specific use of these AI applications, they may run 
afoul of privacy legislation that protects children.  Further, as 
discussed above, the specific vulnerability in AI systems is that data 
accumulated over time may not have been collected in compliance 
with privacy statutes, creating a risk that data held and used by the AI 
programmers may come from an illegitimate source. 
Congress has enacted numerous statutes that regulate data privacy 
when it concerns children and education, and the Transparency 
Model can help AI system stakeholders comply with them.  The 
collection of data on children and the potential negative 
consequences of failing to protect children’s identities are some of the 
main concerns that gave rise to the Fair Information Practice 
Principles.188  The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 
(COPPA) prohibits the collection of data about children under 
thirteen without their parents’ consent.189  The onus is on AI data 
providers and trainers to ensure that the data they use to train AI 
systems was not collected from children without their parents’ 
consent.190  Moreover, data collectors must ensure that their data 
does not “run away” from them to third parties or unknown entities, 
as parents retain the right under COPPA to request destruction of the 
data collected on their child.191  These requirements imply that AI 
trainers should be aware of how their datasets were collected, and on 
whom they have stored data. 
COPPA created numerous obligations for multiple entities in the 
AI design process, including the AI system operators that create 
applications marketed towards children.  Operators have to make the 
data they are collecting transparent, and must reveal how they collect 
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and use it.192  Operators also have to disclose whether they have sold 
the dataset to other operators, and the parents would have to consent 
to that.193  The proposed Transparency Model, therefore, fits squarely 
within the requirements of COPPA and would help operators in this 
space comply with their already existing legal obligations. 
c. Data, AI, and Consumer Finance 
Financial services is the leading economic sector adopting AI 
today, and it seems entities in this arena will continue to invest in AI 
moving forward.194  Lenders and financial institutions utilize AI 
systems in their operations,195 and the market is expanding so rapidly 
that the impact is already noticeable.196  AI systems utilize social 
media platforms, handwriting style, and other unorthodox sources of 
data to predict whether an applicant would be a trustworthy 
borrower, among other things.197  Financial institutions access loan 
histories, credit reports, and purchase histories that detail consumer 
behaviors on a granular level; AI systems incorporate these 
traditional and untraditional data sources in an attempt to predict the 
creditworthiness of potential borrowers.198 
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In short, AI systems not only track human behavior on- and off-
line, but also reach all sorts of financial decisions — determining 
which loans consumers qualify for, what interest rates to charge, 
where to invest certain funds, and whether a particular transaction 
will be profitable.199  One AI system claims to consider over twelve 
thousand different variables concerning a credit applicant.200  One 
financial firm, Underwrite.AI, describes its use of machine learning: 
The focus of machine learning today is to create computer 
algorithms that learn from data and can make accurate predictions 
of [creditworthiness] based upon the patterns deduced within the 
data.  Unlike traditional statistical modeling, the predictive models 
of machine learning are generated by the computer algorithm, as 
opposed to determinations made by statisticians based upon their 
interpretation of the results of linear regression and related 
techniques.201 
The combination of exponential increases in data collection with the 
ability of AI systems to process massive amounts of data creates new 
legal challenges and risks for financial institutions.202 
These emerging business practices must comply with the Fair 
Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) and other regulations protecting 
consumer borrowers.  The FCRA requires consumer reporting 
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agencies to have procedures that ensure the credit process is “fair and 
equitable to the consumer, with regard to the confidentiality, 
accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization of such information.”203  It 
also creates rights for consumers with respect to their credit reports, 
and places requirements on entities that collect, distribute and use 
these reports.204  The FCRA’s primary aim is to require that 
information about a credit applicant is accurate, and to ensure 
procedures that can ameliorate errors.205 
Credit reports will typically include a massive amount of personally 
identifying information.206  When a consumer alleges that an aspect of 
a credit report is inaccurate, the reporting agency must look into the 
consumer’s claims.207  Reporting agencies must also safeguard the 
reports by releasing them only for specifically enumerated purposes 
and by ensuring that the requester identifies him or herself, states the 
purpose for why the information is needed, and manifests that the 
information will only be used for permissible purposes.208 
Many challenges arise concerning where to store and how to treat 
the underlying data that facilitates these financial decisions.  Most AI 
systems that evaluate credit applicants offer third-party services, 
entailing some sort of exchange between the data owner and the data 
holder, and raising concerns about which entities have access to what 
data.209  Of course, these third parties are responsible for maintaining 
the security of the data.210  Still, the third party may utilize the data to 
improve its service and inform its operations for future applicants.  
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For example, maybe it would create an internal profile for 
individuals, to identify that person across applications.  This could 
lead to situations where an applicant is rejected not because of 
objective evidence, but because of previous determinations made by 
the AI system.  In other words, it is conceivable that a negative 
determination for an individual based on a dataset could result in a 
negative determination for that individual permanently.  If the AI 
system denies credit to someone who is actually creditworthy, and this 
mistake is not corrected, it will be reinforced over time, causing 
serious detriment to that person.  The stakes involved thus support 
our proposal that companies involved in this space act very cautiously 
and ensure that people are not wrongfully excluded from the credit 
marketplace. 
It is also of note that the implementing regulation of the Equal 
Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) makes clear that “lenders who use 
non-traditional factors in making credit determinations must 
implement ‘empirically derived, demonstrably and statistically sound, 
credit scoring systems.’”211  Moreover, “[t]hese tools must be 
‘developed and validated using accepted statistical principles and 
methodology,’ and must be subject to ongoing evaluation and 
review.”212  By its terms, the ECOA requires measures of 
transparency regarding the datasets used by AI systems.  First, the 
statute requires a “demonstrably” acceptable model, so the lender 
must demonstrate that the underlying training conducted ensures the 
system’s soundness.213  More significantly, the statute requires the 
system to be “subject to ongoing evaluation and review.”214  
Presumably, the statute would only require transparency with respect 
to regulators, and not necessarily the public at large.  At a minimum, 
however, the statute prohibits complete black box machine learning 
systems that would make lending decisions without any accountability 
or oversight.  Considering that an AI system could violate anti-
discrimination law even while lacking any prejudicial mindset, it 
behooves trainers of AI systems to ensure that the data they use will 
not “taint” the AI system.215 
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2. General Normative Expectations of Privacy 
In previous sections, this Article discussed how legislation 
addresses privacy and the kinds of requirements imposed on AI 
stakeholders who work in specific economic sectors.  Privacy is a 
nebulous concept, and its precise definition and contours have been 
extensively debated.216  This work does not purport to treat every 
detail of this complex topic.  That said, this section of the Article aims 
to show that even when no statute prohibits a particular AI 
application because of privacy concerns, the industry can nonetheless 
violate expectations of privacy as they exist normatively, and can also 
erode those expectations over time as technology evolves.  For 
example, in 2006, AOL released twenty million search queries of 
650,000 of its users.217  While it removed individuals’ usernames and 
IP addresses, reporters were quickly able to identify User 
No. 4417749 based on the user’s three search queries: “landscapers in 
Lilburn, Ga,” a few people with the last name “Arnold,” and “homes 
sold in shadow lake subdivision gwinnett county Georgia.”218  The 
reporters successfully identified a sixty-two-year-old widow named 
Thelma, who admitted she had also searched for topics such as “60 
single men,” and “dog that urinates on everything.”219  This 
demonstrates that even data that was “anonymized” may not actually 
have been so, or that this process may have occurred in an insufficient 
manner. 
Anonymization becomes a problem when huge datasets are 
released to the public without regard to the implications of the 
Mosaic Theory.220  The Mosaic Theory posits that even where the 
typical identifying characteristics of a person are obscured, such as 
name, social security number, date of birth, address, etc., in a large 
dataset one can de-anonymize someone probabilistically because of 
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the minimal likelihood that someone else shares the combination of a 
multitude of other characteristics.221 
Widespread adoption of AI systems could increase the potential of 
de-anonymization.  Presently, AI systems cannot function without 
vast amounts of data, as they must have a sufficient number of 
datapoints to effectively learn patterns and come to conclusions.  In 
other words, the proliferation of AI systems automatically increases 
demand for large datasets, and the larger these datasets become, the 
easier and more likely de-anonymization becomes.  With this growth 
in demand for big data, it is increasingly vital that AI operators fully 
disclose the sorts of data they use and the sources of that data.  This 
would enable individuals to determine the various ways that data is 
being used in their favor or to their detriment.  Considering that 
datasets are routinely transferred from one company to another, 
which may or may not be completely unrelated,222 absent 
transparency it would be impossible for a consumer to know just how 
much their reputation precedes them when they travel from one 
website to another, one credit application to another, or one job to 
another. 
3. Privacy by Design 
Privacy by Design is the notion that throughout the design and 
lifecycle of a product or service, privacy should play a prominent role 
when considering various options.223  There are seven “foundational 
principles” of Privacy by Design, the first of which stating that privacy 
initiatives should be “proactive not reactive, preventative not 
remedial.”224  In other words, privacy should be the default setting, 
embedded into the design itself throughout the product’s entire 
lifecycle.225  The product should have fully functional privacy 
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protections with end to end security, and should be continuously 
visible and transparent regarding user privacy.226 
Privacy by Design incorporates the “fair information practices 
common in most privacy legislation in use today: notice, choice and 
consent, proximity and locality, anonymity and pseudonymity, 
security, and access and recourse.”227  Privacy by Design offers an 
efficient framework for an AI developer to ensure that the data used 
to train an AI system is not compromised.  Even though Privacy by 
Design focuses on visibility and transparency, “there should not be 
any confusion around the necessity to encrypt, obscure, or otherwise 
properly protect data.”228  Whether traditional personally identifying 
data, user data, or other potentially sensitive data, there is an inherent 
duty to safeguard the privacy interest in the data collected, stored, or 
used.229 
For many years, the FTC has advocated for Privacy by Design: 
“Privacy by Design” and “Security by Design” [are] both concepts 
[that] seek to protect consumers’ privacy and security from the 
outset of product design.  In an era where AI systems and machine 
learning, algorithms and big data sets can hire and fire, inform 
health care decisions and extend financial opportunities, it is vital 
that these technologies do not run counter to established legal 
protections or public policy goals.  In the same way companies 
incorporate privacy and security, so too should we have Data Ethics 
by Design.230 
The concern for AI system operators is that the data they use to 
train the system not run afoul of privacy requirements and 
expectations.  As discussed, statutes require special treatment for 
information pertaining to health, children, and consumer finance, and 
normative privacy expectations also place some limits on the extent to 
which an AI system will use datasets that violate consumer privacy. 
In summary, using specific types of data, or using data in specific 
contexts, can create issues that implicate privacy concerns that 
trainers of AI systems ought to consider.  Whether it is the type of 
data, such as health data, or the subject of data, such as children, or 
the context in which data is used, such as in consumer lending or 
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other economic sectors protected by anti-discrimination legislation, 
AI systems are operating in spaces governed by existing privacy and 
anti-discrimination regulatory regimes.  Hence, AI stakeholders, 
including operators, must ensure that the datasets used to train their 
AI systems do not violate these regulatory regimes.  One way to start 
meeting this obligation is through the Transparency Model proposed 
in the following Part of the Article. 
III. THE AI DATA TRANSPARENCY MODEL 
A. The Need for an AI Data Transparency Model 
The AI Data Transparency Model is a first step towards ensuring 
that the data used to train AI systems complies with all relevant 
regulations and societal expectations, which may otherwise limit the 
AI’s use.  In previous sections, this Article has identified some of the 
many risks that AI systems could pose for individuals and society as a 
whole.231  This work also discussed the myriad ways in which the data 
used in AI systems could run afoul of privacy and anti-discrimination 
legal regimes.232  The Transparency Model argues that dataset users 
up and down the data supply chain must ensure that the data remains 
in compliance with existing laws.  In cases where AI systems are 
provided or exposed to data, the trainers should actively ensure that 
the providers include assurances of the data’s propriety.  Audits 
should evaluate the sources of the data, the data’s contents, and 
whether the data’s use complies with any regulatory limits that arise.  
These procedures should be reasonable and flexible, so that they can 
conform to the type of data used and the role that the AI system 
plays.  Considering the crucial role that data plays in creating AI 
systems and their outcomes, these procedures should be adopted and 
standardized by stakeholders.  There should also be a process 
whereby conformity with the standards proposed herein can be 
evaluated and certified by objective third parties.  This will incentivize 
best practices by encouraging transparent operations, which would 
increase reputational risks for developers that do not pay appropriate 
attention to the dangers enumerated above.  While the suggested 
Transparency Model will not solve all of the emerging issues 
associated with AI systems, it will help clarify some of them while also 
illuminating further areas of concern and giving guidelines to an 
industry that currently operates in a regulatory vacuum. 
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There are four main components to the proposed AI Data 
Transparency Model.  First, stakeholders in the AI systems industry 
should conduct audits and examine the data their AI systems are 
exposed to, according to the type of data collected and the risk of 
misuse.  Second, stakeholders should be required to retain the data 
they used to train the AI in case there is a future need to further 
scrutinize how the AI system was developed.  Third, audits should be 
standardized and conducted by objective third parties who are not the 
developers themselves; these third parties should also certify the 
results of the audits.  Finally, the Transparency Model provides for a 
safe harbor — AI systems operators should enjoy some protections 
from liability in limited circumstances, when they earnestly comply 
with the Model but harm occurs nonetheless. 
The four components of the Transparency Model are just some of 
many possible responses to the AI revolution.  One alternative would 
be to simply do nothing and allow this advanced technology to 
develop further before trying to rein it in.  But this alternative is a 
dangerous one, as it does nothing to incentivize the cultivation of best 
practices that consider the public interest early on.233  Another 
alternative is to reject the idea that individuals should have privacy 
interests in their own data.  After all, each individual’s respective, tiny 
piece of data constitutes a minuscule percentage of the massive 
datasets out there, composed of billions of individuals (as the adage 
goes, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts).  At the other 
extreme, perhaps data should be controlled much more stringently, by 
government regulators who would mandate inspections and require 
disclosures, akin to the Securities and Exchange Commission or the 
Internal Revenue Service.  The proposed Transparency Model 
represents an appropriate balance between these two extremes, and 
will help incentivize more ethical uses of data by AI developers 
without threatening or hindering the development of the technology 
altogether. 
The most prudent way to balance the need for AI innovation 
against the dangers of discrimination, privacy violations and other 
transgressions such as copyright infringement, is to mandate and 
encourage disclosures of the types of data used and the manner in 
which this data helps AI systems produce their output.  The 
disclosures should be the result of scrutinizing audits of the data, 
which ought to evaluate the data’s integrity, origin, and quality, as 
well as identify any potential for violating discrimination or privacy 
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statutes and norms.234  These periodic audits should evaluate both the 
training phase of the AI system, and how the system is continuously 
operated.235  They should examine where the datasets came from, 
what information they contain, and what permissions and limitations 
affect how the datasets can be used.236 
With all this information collected, the auditor should look at what 
the AI system does and verify that its particular use, combined with 
the type of data, does not run afoul of any regulatory requirements.237  
It is imperative that the auditor be someone other than the 
stakeholders themselves.  Depending upon the sort of data collected 
and the AI system’s purpose, this audit should examine the data 
according to existing legal rules, such as those described above.  
Problems resulting from bad data and harmful AI systems are not 
necessarily attributable to a lack of legislation that proscribes 
negative outcomes; rather, they are the result of the sophisticated 
manner in which AI systems operate, which eludes easy 
determinations of whether such practices comply with existing 
legislation.  Further, the difficulty of enforcing these laws on AI 
systems is partially due to a lack of understanding of how AI systems 
work, as well as an overreliance on, and false overconfidence in, 
advanced technologies.238 
The purpose of the auditing process is to ensure reliability and trust 
in the AI industry, while also enabling the technology to keep 
growing and developing.  The Transparency Model seeks to establish 
a set of standards that would help address and reduce some of the 
most common pitfalls and issues concerning misuse of datasets in AI 
systems.  The Model can be compared to the NIST Framework as 
promulgated by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, 
which created a multi-step process an entity can take to determine its 
cybersecurity and data protection risks as well as to evaluate 
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appropriate responses.239  The AI Data Transparency Model consists 
of a set of checklists and tasks that provide a roadmap for AI 
developers, trainers and operators to ensure that the data being used 
complies with all relevant requirements.  In this sense, the 
Transparency Model works to ensure that privacy and equality 
protections are considered at each stage of AI development, rather 
than only as an afterthought. 
Another part of the Transparency Model will be to certify that AI 
systems were successfully audited for unreasonable risks to privacy 
and discrimination.  This part of the Model is inspired by other 
instances of disclosure and transparency rules that have worked in 
other industries, such as food and drugs, and is consistent with other 
scholars’ approaches to these issues.240  There are many examples of 
certification programs that indicate whether a product has 
successfully met a particular set of standards: the organic food 
labeling regime, which has helped foster a market for organic foods 
and educates consumers about the ingredients in their foods;241 or the 
Kosher label added to foods after inspection by the relevant 
authorities.242 
Finally, where an AI stakeholder substantially complies with the 
Transparency Model, they should enjoy some degree of safe harbor 
against liability for limited and inadvertent mistakes made by an AI 
system.  The Model does not include a strict liability regime for all 
violations resulting from an errant AI system or slight mistakes in 
datasets.  This safe harbor serves numerous purposes.  First, it 
preserves judicial economy by preventing plaintiffs from insisting 
retroactively on discovery into massive datasets.  This is particularly 
important when violations might be nothing more than inadvertent 
infringements that represent small deviations from regulatory 
requirements, in contrast to harms that result from an unwillingness 
to protect against foreseeable consequences that derive from lack of 
attention to the dataset’s composition and origin.  Second, the Model 
 
 239. See Cybersecurity Framework, NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH., 
https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework [https://perma.cc/4TU7-6BUZ]. 
 240. For an argument that algorithms should be regulated in a similar manner to 
environmental impact statements, see generally Andrew D. Selbst, Disparate Impact 
in Big Data Policing, 52 GA. L. REV. 109 (2018). 
 241. See generally History of Organic Farming in the United States, SUSTAINABLE 
AGRIC. RES. & EDUC., https://www.sare.org/Learning-Center/Bulletins/Transitioning-
to-Organic-Production/Text-Version/History-of-Organic-Farming-in-the-United-
States [https://perma.cc/JDY9-NSZ5]. 
 242. See What Does Kosher Mean?, BADATZ IGUD RABBONIM, 
http://www.koshercertification.org.uk/whatdoe.html [https://perma.cc/748Q-HQLS]. 
2019] FORDHAM URB. L.J. 477 
rewards desirable behavior by encouraging dataset owners to inquire 
into the source of what they are using to train their AI systems, and 
fosters sincere efforts to avoid violating the law.243  Self-regulation 
works when it can incentivize the internalization of risk, rather than 
leaving consumers to accept the costs.  The safe harbor would not 
protect against intentional infringement or negligent standards 
regarding the evaluation of datasets.  As long as it is cheaper for an 
AI operator to implement safeguards than it would be to risk legal 
exposure, the operator would act rationally and seek to comply with 
the requirements of the safe harbor.  Finally, establishing this 
juxtaposition will leave consumers better off, because the potential 
harms of bad data and misused datasets will be alleviated such that 
consumers will not be harmed in the first place. 
B. The Benefits of the AI Data Transparency Model 
1. The Benefit of Increased Transparency 
The sort of transparency proposed in the AI Data Transparency 
Model is not only beneficial by preventing the harms discussed in Part 
I, regarding discrimination and privacy violations, but it is also 
beneficial as an end itself.  By cultivating a culture of transparency, 
the fears and stigmas associated with AI systems can be mitigated, 
and the Transparency Model will help instill a trust that machine 
learning technologies will not be misused.244  Transparency enables 
“shaming” in the event that an AI system produces inappropriate 
outcomes, though that presumes that there is an audience before 
whom to shame the wrongdoer, and that the operator in charge of the 
system would respond to such shaming.245  Where an AI system 
functions inappropriately — by, for example, misidentifying people of 
color as criminals or rejecting great applicants for a job or educational 
opportunity because of their gender — transparency helps society 
understand what went wrong.  Moreover, where the AI system 
operator is dedicated to implementing steps to prevent such 
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unfortunate outcomes, transparency helps that system operator show 
that this mistake was unfortunate, rectifiable, and not the result of 
wantonness or recklessness.246  Further, transparency can help 
identify which actor in the data supply chain is responsible — is the 
violation the result of the data used to train the AI system, the biases 
of the AI’s trainer, or an example of an AI system going out of tune 
and running amok?  Additionally, many of the prescriptions offered 
here amount to “good press” as long as the AI operator is sufficiently 
in compliance, as evidence of such compliance can help foster trust 
between the operator and consumers.247  By cultivating these positive 
industry practices and standards, transparency increases trust in 
machine learning technology itself and helps consumers understand 
the ways in which they benefit from the technology. 
It is true that what “transparency” calls for exactly is often 
unclear,248 but this is a strength of the Model proposed here, not a 
flaw.  “Transparency” could mean having a particular person 
understand what aspects of their digital background led to a harmful 
AI result.  It might mean that individuals ought to know the 
backgrounds of datapoints that are most similar to them, or the ways 
in which they are similar to datapoints within the underlying dataset.  
It could mean knowing the confidence level that the AI operator has 
in the system, or the error rate of that system.  It can mean an 
understanding of the system itself, involving disclosure of information 
regarding the system’s setup, the data used to train it, its objective 
and predictive success, and other aspects of its operation.249  Under 
the Transparency Model, the meaning of “transparency” depends on 
the nature of the AI program being evaluated.  When “transparency” 
serves as a means to achieve specific regulatory or business-oriented 
objectives, such as anti-discrimination, privacy protection, or some 
other concern that the dataset implicates, the Model can remain 
relevant and impactful across industries and AI systems.  By flexibly 
adjusting to specific contexts, the Model helps avoid the problem of 
untailored or overly-tailored approaches, which are either too 
comprehensive for certain needs or too basic for others. 
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2. Value Adding 
At the core of the Transparency Model is the contention that 
“bad” data, whether discriminatory or privacy-violating, reduces the 
likelihood that AI systems will produce good outcomes.250  By 
facilitating a framework that reduces the use of problematic data, the 
likelihood of adverse outcomes will similarly decrease.  It is true that 
requiring compliance with the Transparency Model will likely 
increase the initial costs of training AI systems, which would 
inevitably raise costs for consumers of goods or services provided by 
or utilizing AI.  However, the decreased risk of adverse outcomes 
could offset some of those increased costs, and once consumers gain 
trust in AI systems those costs would be offset even further.  
Moreover, creditors and investors can gain confidence in the AI 
system’s development, which might result in lower interest expenses 
and transaction costs associated with raising capital.  By certifying the 
provenance and legitimacy of data, AI developers can aid their 
investors in conducting due diligence. 
Examples given throughout this Article provide support for this 
argument.251  Unjustified denials of promotions in the employment 
context leads to talented individuals going unrewarded.  This creates 
costs for the company in that it now has a worse employment 
hierarchy than it would have had, and in that it could lose that 
employee entirely because she feels slighted by the lack of promotion.  
Similarly, unwarranted denials of credit by AI systems that wrongly 
predict creditworthiness lead to less customers for credit card and 
finance companies, which leads to less revenue for that company and 
diminished economic activity for society at large.  In the same vein, 
schools that use AI systems to evaluate student applications could see 
a weaker student body if that system fails to identify worthy 
applicants simply because they do not fit the “traditional” standard 
that system was taught.  In each of these examples, the goal is clear: to 
find the best applicant.  A more fine-tuned AI system can reach 
better results than a system whose operations and development are 
not scrutinized.  Hence, while implementing the Transparency Model 
may increase costs due to auditing the data for all stakeholders in an 
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AI system, from development to operations, the final output of those 
systems may very well be far more valuable. 
In Part II above, this Article addressed possible evils that can result 
from faultily-composed datasets, which can lead AI systems to 
discriminate against protected groups or to violate privacy 
protections.  Just because these injuries occur “beneath the surface,” 
embedded within the training of an AI system, does not mean that 
they are excusable.  As AI systems participate more and more in 
business operations, their developers will have to grapple with the 
serious issues that surround the ways AI systems use data.  There are 
already examples of businesses that suffer reputational harms when 
datasets cause AI systems to perform inappropriately or illegally, and 
there is no sound reason to de-emphasize scrutiny in this space merely 
because the mechanisms are more complicated than traditional 
business practices. 
3. Flexibility 
As briefly touched upon above, the Transparency Model is flexible 
in nature.  The scrutiny of the auditing process should change 
depending upon what is reasonable under the circumstances — in 
light of how the data was collected and what the responsibility of the 
trained AI will be.  In other words, scrutiny may be higher or lower 
depending on the particular outcome that the AI system produces: 
If the private sector industry in question is regulated, such as the 
auto or pharmaceutical industry, evidence of correctness can 
naturally become a requirement.  If the sector in question is not 
regulated . . . [the entity] should consider their requirements for 
demonstrating the correctness of their automated decision making 
as a best practice, since it will enable trust in their products and 
services.252 
For example, an AI that drives cars, analyzes medical symptoms or 
manages pension fund portfolios should have its data more closely 
scrutinized than an AI created to play a board game.253  These 
considerations inform the evaluator of what the probability of an 
undesirable outcome may be, and what the consequences for such an 
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outcome would look like.  Regulated sectors, such as housing, 
employment, and healthcare must obviously comply with all relevant 
legal requirements, which would inform the evaluator about the 
harms she is scrutinizing the AI system for.  On the other hand, where 
the AI exists for entertainment, the evaluator may consider the harms 
that privacy encroachments pose for the company’s reputation, the 
need to collect such data, or the risk of harms that a breach of the 
data would cause the subjects in the dataset.  In short, the evaluator 
would need to consider both legal requirements, where applicable, as 
well as normative and reputational ones, and have the flexibility to 
weigh AI data violations differently according to the circumstances. 
Because AI is rapidly developing, maintaining a flexible approach 
to regulation can efficiently and fairly balance the utility of 
developing the technology against the costs that society could 
suffer.254  Within the copyright regime, for example, a “technological 
fair use” doctrine would properly balance the equities between the 
need to grow the technology sector and the rights of the copyright 
holders to avoid AI systems from using and relying on their works.255  
This notion of fair use could also apply to the harms addressed here, 
to instances where the AI operators make clear and concerted efforts 
to avoid violative results that infringe on privacy or produce 
undesirable outcomes.  In short, it is not the case that the nature of 
AI as a black box will inevitably lead to rampant discrimination, but 
its use will not lead to the end of discrimination either.  It is the case, 
however, that encouraging AI operators to be transparent about how 
they use data and what that data is, and certifying that they are not 
behaving in ways that increase discriminatory outcomes, could steer 
AI systems towards less discriminatory outcomes, benefiting society 
at large. 
The proposed Transparency Model focuses on what is 
ascertainable by inspecting and evaluating the data, rather than the 
mysterious inner-workings of an algorithm that returns results with 
unintelligible rationales.256  It also helps fill a void, also noticed by 
other scholars, by focusing on data rather than on the algorithm that 
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is using this data.257  A rigid regulatory scheme risks both over-
regulation and under-regulation.  The former of these would subject 
certain AI systems to requirements that are unnecessary to achieve 
the regulation’s objective of careful scrutiny of potentially harmful 
data.  The latter would fail to protect against a developer or AI 
system that fails to proscribe undesirable data uses.  Thus, the 
Transparency Model is intentionally limited in the sense that it does 
not have specific requirements that should apply to every AI system, 
apart from continued compliance with existing laws.  AI systems exist 
in far-flung industries, utilizing vastly different datasets for any 
number of distinct uses — the solution devised to promote accuracy 
in results from AI systems must be equally flexible. 
C. Theoretical Justifications 
1. Law and Economic Theory: Transparency, Accountability, and 
Efficiency 
At the core of the Transparency Model is the contention that 
transparency is a precursor to accountability: “If law and due process 
are absent from this field, we are essentially paving the way to a new 
feudal order of unaccountable reputational intermediates.”258  This 
means that society cannot hold a malicious algorithm accountable if it 
does not subject it to some measure of transparency.  The converse of 
this is also true, that society must keep transparent the process of 
holding algorithms accountable.  As one set of authors noted: 
Strong arguments support the position that algorithmic agents that 
operate without proper, or flawed, human oversight; or absent of 
well-defined governance and ethical frameworks, may have negative 
effects on greater societal norms and values such as the holy 
triumvirate of liberte, egalite, fraternité — or to put it in the 
language of the existing legal frameworks, fundamental human 
rights and freedoms, equality and social cohesion.259 
Because these values are so integral to society, the implication is 
that transparency serves dual purposes — as a corollary norm to 
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fundamental human rights, and as a means to ensure that those 
fundamental rights are not infringed upon. 
The theory of law and economics suggests that where the 
operations and development of AI systems are made more 
transparent, transactions between their operators and consumers will 
become more efficient.260  Without transparency, there is no way for 
consumers to determine how much data collectors take, what sort of 
data they take, with whom they share it, and how they use it.261  
Transparency is a means by which society can verify that the 
drawbacks of AI systems do not outweigh the benefits.  Because 
rights and responsibilities can conflict with one another, in order to 
ascertain whether an AI system imposes itself on other arenas that 
merit protection, some aspects of the system should be reviewable 
and accessible.  Mandating transparency can also facilitate innovation 
by opening access to the data inputs used by one successful enterprise 
to the benefit of all.  Hence, when an entity uses data in predictive 
analytics, but did not collect that data itself, a degree of transparency 
is necessary to ensure that contractual or statutory limitations on the 
use of that data are not breached.262  Transparency can help alleviate 
the numerous risks created when this kind of data is used, including 
the possibility of security breaches, inadvertent nonconsensual uses, 
or worse — that a machine learning algorithm could use data in ways 
that violate privacy and anti-discrimination laws. 
2. The Market Structure and the Multi-Player Model 
A common characteristic of a completed AI system is that 
numerous entities contributed to its development.  At least ten 
different types of actors can help program an AI system, including the 
software trainers, the data provider, the feedback provider (or 
trainer), the user, the owner and her employees, her investors, the 
public or the government, and even the AI itself.263  Any of these 
players can expose an AI system to data, which can then be 
distributed to other players who may combine it with more data, 
resulting in new sources and insights.264  This distribution of labor 
creates problems of knowledge and oversight over the contents of the 
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dataset.  Because the sources of access to new data are so diffuse, it 
becomes more difficult to determine who should be responsible for 
bad data.  Someone who downloads a dataset of millions of images to 
train a facial recognition AI may not realize that the dataset was 
biased in ways that could produce discriminatory outcomes.  She may 
not realize, for example, that the datapoints therein are largely 
composed of Caucasian faces, limiting the utility of the dataset in 
recognizing other racial groups. This hypothetical demonstrates that 
the Multi-Player nature of AI development increases the risk that 
datasets could be compromised by impermissible datapoints. 
Data is not only collected by entities that use it for their own 
purposes, but it is also distributed to other entities who may use it for 
the same, or for a different purpose than the original data collector.265  
Indeed, some data collectors retain data solely to distribute it to other 
users.  Whenever datasets change hands, are adjusted for analysis, or 
combined with other data, the possibility of misuse or corruption 
grows.266  This also complicates any effort to ensure consensual use of 
data, because at a certain point it could very well become impossible 
to ascertain where the specific datapoint originated from, and 
whether that datapoint was permissibly collected.  A given consumer, 
concerned about the diffusion of their information, cannot readily 
control their information absent some degree of transparency.  
Additionally, even if the consumer initially consented to various 
piecemeal collections of their personal data, if those datapoints are 
aggregated the result could create a profile of that consumer far 
beyond anything she ever thought was possible.  Thus, the main 
purpose of the AI Data Transparency Model is to focus on the long 
run, by incentivizing stakeholders to use reliable data, thereby 
focusing on the prevention of harm rather than the assignment of 
liability. 
3. Law and Economic Theory: Self-Regulating Incentive 
Mechanism 
One glaring problem of AI applications is how difficult it is for 
someone to know if they were incorrectly “rejected” or labeled 
“unworthy.”  For a host of reasons, self-regulation offers a more 
efficient route to ascertaining the chances that these unfortunate 
results will occur.  First, the applicant or consumer may not be aware 
that the company is utilizing an AI system, so it would be impossible 
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for her to suspect that her rejection occurred because of a 
misconfigured AI system.  Next, considering the explosion of uses of 
AI systems in a wide variety of commercial arenas, it is unlikely that a 
government response could adequately regulate a technological tool 
that is used for all sorts of purposes in a multitude of economic 
sectors, transcending the regulatory jurisdictions currently carved out 
in the United States.  Instead, each company that utilizes an AI 
system is in a far better position to make sure that it is operating 
within the confines of the law.  Just as regulatory authorities depend 
on independent audits by accountants to ensure the financial 
propriety of large corporations, so too could the government depend 
on private sector audits that ensure compliance with federal law in AI 
systems.  This is not to say that the government should play no role in 
regulating AI, but rather to argue that any effective regulatory regime 
will require private sector involvement and cooperation, and that all 
of this begins with transparency. 
CONCLUSION 
The advent of huge data sources facilitates numerous applications: 
“trends/pattern analysis; regulatory compliance; fraud detection and 
prevention; predictive analysis and modeling; incident prediction; 
geo-correlation; sentiment analysis; diagnostic and medical use; and 
others.”267  In some cases, the data used in machine learning tends to 
have numerous features in common.  First, it is non-exclusive and 
non-rivalrous, and multiple parties can use the same data without 
consequence.  For the most part, it is inexpensive and easily collected.  
Moreover, it is everywhere.268  This Article demonstrates that AI 
systems are delving more and more into areas that are protected, 
regulated, and valued in special ways, implicating privacy and equality 
concerns.  As AI systems delve into these highly sensitive areas of 
society, operators must carefully consider the risks that arise when 
they mistreat and misuse data.  The AI Data Transparency Model 
suggested here can help address these risks.  As part of the 
Transparency Model, AI stakeholders should implement privacy and 
equality by design, adopting guidelines that meet legal requirements 
from the very first moment they expose their system to data.  
Stakeholders should audit the datasets they use to train their AI, 
relying on independent third parties who can verify that their data 
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practices do not run afoul of existing norms and legislation.  
Additionally, a third-party certification mechanism can increase 
public trust regarding the use of AI systems, and help companies save 
face when mistakes do occur.  Finally, to incentivize compliance with 
these recommendations, a safe harbor is appropriate for operators 
who make special efforts to avoid the dataset problems discussed.  
These recommendations will not be possible without significant 
increases in transparency, which is a means to facilitate continued 
innovation in this field without increasing the risk of public backlash.  
AI technologies have great potential to tremendously benefit society, 
but without transparent, careful progress, they can violate 
fundamental principles of equality, fairness, and privacy. 
